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Ah, Lord, teach us to consider that we must die, so that we might
become wise. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the last four decades, the law has erected a framework that
facilitates medical decision making for terribly ill persons who lack the
capacity to make decisions on their own. As a practical matter, attorneys
in every state can now guide clients through the process of advance care
planning. The details vary from state to state, but uniformly throughout
the states people can identify surrogate decision makers and delineate
preferences for surrogates to follow should the principal need medical
care while the principal lacks decision-making capacity. Still, this body
of law has been only partially successful in easing the process of dying
for patients, the burden on family members, and the choices facing clinictans.
Alongside the law's responses, clinicians2-and the health care facilities within which they work-increasingly consider how best to respond to the needs of dying or terribly ill patients who lack capacity. Attitudes among clinicians toward end-of-life care have transformed
dramatically in the last four decades. When New Jersey's highest court
entertained the case of Karen Ann Quinlan in the mid-1970s, 3 the court
reported that Karen's clinicians, as well as experts who testified, agreed
that withdrawing respiratory support "would not conform to medical
practices, standards and traditions.':>4 Now, most clinicians endorse withholding and withdrawing care from terminally ill patients as an accepted
part of end-of-life care (assuming that the patient voices or once voiced
that preference). 5 Many hospitals now offer educational programs that

1
Johann Sebastian Bach, Bach Cantata BWV I 06 ("Gottes Zeit Ist die Allerbeste
Zeit"). The language is a liberal translation of Psalm 90:12.
2
This Article uses the term clinicians to refer to health care professionals, especially to
physicians, nurses, and physician assistants.
3
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,655 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See infra
Part IV.B.I (considering Quinlan case).
4
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655. At the time, Karen was in a persistent vegetative state. Her
treating neurologist refused to be part of any order to remove Karen's respirator. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). Even at the time some clinicians differentiated cases such as Karen's involving a persistent vegetative patient from cases involving terminally ill patients. See DAVID 0RENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW 271 (2d ed. 2008); see also infra Part IV.B.I.a (summarizing Quinlan).
5
See Kathryn L. Tucker, Give Me Liberty at My Death: Expanding End-of-Life Choices
in Massachusetts, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 259,263 (2013-14).
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guide clinicians through the difficult task of assisting patients and their
loved ones in dealing with medical choices faced by people who are very
ill or dying. 6
Changes in the approaches of law and medicine to appropriate care
for terminally ill patients developed within a larger socio-cultural frame.
Within that frame, autonomous individuality has largely trumped the
primacy of communal hierarchy within the world of health care. The informed consent doctrine constitutes a central outgrowth of that shift. 7
More generally, new understandings of personhood and community,
spawned by the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, facilitated
changes in society's understanding of death and dying. This Article considers the development of advance-care-planning laws within the context
of shifting visions of death and dying in the Western world.
Curiously, the most dramatic shift in visions of death and dyingone that has privileged dying over death as the focus of public attention-seems to have appeared as much as a century before the development of medical technology that actually facilitated the prolongation of
dying long beyond that which was previously possible. Society's focus
on dying-a part of living, however particular-rather than on death
serves a variety of functions. Today, that focus responds to practical
challenges faced by most dying people. Less transparently, it may serve
to displace anxiety about death and even to mask the inevitability of
death-a matter largely entertained through the lens of religious belief
before the nineteenth century. The focus on dying's demands has produced a series of responses from law, medicine, and society. These responses, in turn, reflect attitudes about illness, health care, the clinicianpatient relationship, and personhood.
Part II of this Article contextualizes consideration of advance care
planning within the broad sweep of Western history's shifting visions of
death, and then later of dying. Then, Part III offers basic demographic
facts about the reality of death and dying in the contemporary United
States. Further, it describes developments in medicine that facilitated a
number of demographic changes, beginning in the second half of the
twentieth century. In the last three or four decades of the twentieth century, the law began to respond to the new reality of dying. Part IV details
the judicial and legislative responses to medical decision making for pa6
For the most part, advance care planning is assumed to pertain to end-of-life decision
making. In addition to that, however, advance care planning can be important for very ill patients without capacity who are not facing terminal conditions.
7
See infra Part IV.A.
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tients without capacity that culminated in every state's providing for advance care planning by the end of the twentieth century.
Despite the ubiquity of advance care planning laws, most people
still fail to complete advance directives, and even those who do complete
these legal forms do not necessarily talk with their prospective surrogate
decision makers or with their clinicians about their preferences and
needs. Part V reviews a crucial development-long awaited and only
partially in place at this time 8-that will effectively define advance care
planning as a component of good health care. An important component
of that development, discussed in Part VI, involves paying clinicians to
engage in advance-care-planning conversations with patients. In July
2015, Medicare proposed two billing codes that will pay clinicians to
engage in such conversations. 9 The codes are limited, but offer promise
that other insurers will follow this lead and that the Medicare codes will
be broadened over time. Finally, the last Part of this Article considers an
interdisciplinary model for educating the public and professionals about
the significance of advance care planning. Only through open conversations about medical preferences and end-of-life choices among patients
(or potential patients), surrogate decision makers, and clinicians can
those in the latter two groups gain the knowledge needed to wisely translate a patient's wishes into actual decisions in concrete situations that often differ from those referenced on the face of advance directives. This,
simply put, is part of and a model for good health care.
II.

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH AND DYTNG

Societies throughout time and space have responded in various
ways to death. Only recently has dying (as contrasted with death) received significant attention. Until the twentieth century, few people experienced long periods of dying, and no one died connected to lifesupport machines. Throughout human history, death has occasioned a
panoply of emotions and has variously been feared, celebrated, bemoaned, or welcomed.
In much of the world today, death has been medicalized and legalized. These processes have not developed ex nihilo. They reflect broader
trends and respond to deeply embedded assumptions about personhood.10
8

See infra Part V.
See infra notes 274-282 and accompanying text.
10
Those assumptions contrast with assumptions of other cultures and of Western culture
9
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A central feature of death in the modem world is the frequency with
which it is preceded by a sustained period of illness, often chronic illness. 11 Further, in contrast with responses to death during almost all of
the last millennium in the West, death, although understood as inevitable, is often unexpected when it arrives. The long process of dying that
precedes many contemporary deaths, has not conditioned society to accept death. Rather it has conditioned people to presume (despite the
ubiquity of death) that death can always be held at bay a while longer.
This not only differentiates contemporary understandings and experiences of dying and death from those of earlier times and other places, but it
contains clues that explain contemporary approaches-both medical and
popular-to end-of-life medical decision making and to the laws that
channel those approaches.
This part offers a very brief summary of shifting attitudes toward
death and dying over time. Section A reviews predominant attitudes toward death from the medieval period to modem times. Then, Section B
examines shifting attitudes toward death and dying in the nineteenth century. Finally, Section C of this Part considers assumptions in the U.S.
today about death and about how people die and how they should die.
Contemporary attitudes about death and about the process of dying undergird the law's developing rules about medical decision making for
people without capacity, as well as medicine's responses to dying patients.
A. Approaches to Death and Dying in an Historic Context
In The Hour of Death, a remarkable history of attitudes toward
death, Philippe Aries calls attention to an "ancient attitude toward
death"-dominant during the early Middle Ages-extending back to ancient history and perhaps, even to prehistory. 12 During this long period
of time, explains Aries, the "common ordinary death" (conceived as a
"good" death) was preceded, shortly before death approached, by a
warning to the person about to die. 13 That person would then
acknowledge that death's warning had been issued and would communi-

in earlier centuries. See infra Part Ill.
11
See SHARONA HOFFMAN, AGING WITH A PLAN: HOW A LITTLE THOUGHT TODAY
CAN VASTLY IMPROVE YOUR TOMORROW, at xvi (2015).
12
PHILIPPE ARIES, THE HOUR OF DEATH 5 (Helen Weaver trans., Alfred A. Knopf ed.

1981) (1977).
13
!d. at 6.
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cate that fact to those surrounding the sick-bed. 14 In this approach to the
good death, only the dying person knew how much time was left to him
or her 15 : "Neither [the dying man's] doctor nor his friends nor the
priests ... know as much about it as he." 16
Deaths that did not warn were viewed as "the absurd instrument of
chance." 17 Such deaths-known as mors repentina (sudden death)were liable to bring shame and ignorniny. 18 Indeed, a mors repentina
was likely to have been met with silence rather than with the elaborate
rituals that generally surrounded a death that properly warned a dying
person of its imminent arrival. 19 Here Aries remarks quite stunningly:
"Anyone who is aware of the ostentatious displays of mourning that
characterized this period can judge the significance of this silence, which
seems modern."20 That is, the comparative silence that so generally accompanies death in the contemporary world accompanied only a death
deemed ignominious in earlier ages. Even more remarkable, Aries explains that in the modem world, the "sudden" death-for instance, death
in an automobile accident or by way of a gunshot wound-is viewed as
extraordinary. 21 Modem responses to unexpected, sudden deaths tend to
be more outspoken and public than responses to other deaths. 22
Aries found references to a good death as a death that warned before it separated a dying person from life in the literature of the Middle
Ages, including the Song of Roland, the poems of Tristan, and tales of
the Round Table. 23 Sometimes, death's warning came in the form of apparitions or dreams. 24 Sometimes, as in the case of Roland, death announced itself as a feeling that death had begun to "invad[e] [the]
14

Aries illustrates this approach to the good death through reference to Chanson de Roland, the poems of Tristan, and stories of the Knights ofthe Round Table. Jd. at S-6.
15
ld. at 6. With exceptions, Aries relies on male pronouns. It is hard to know whether
that reflects a different experience for dying women or simply that Aries did not know about,
or chose not to focus on, women's death experiences. Were it the case that females experienced death differently than males and were that difference generally known, Aries would
likely have described the difference. He does, however, consider images depicting the death of
the Virgin. ARIES, supra note 12, at 141, 250, 311.
16
I d. at 6.
17
ld. at 10.
18
Jd. at 10.
19
See ARIES, supra note 12, at II.
20
I d. at II (emphasis added).
21
See id. at 6.
22
I d. at II. Such deaths in the modem world-deaths in car accidents or plane crashes or
deaths due to violence-generally receive more publicity than other deaths.
23
See ARIES, supra note 12, at 6.
24
ld. at 6-7.
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body." 25
Aries suggests that changes in attitudes toward death are glacial. 26
Even as late as the eighteenth century, it was considered impressive to
have fore-knowledge about the timing of one's death. 27 By this period,
new attitudes toward death were becoming evident, existing for some
time alongside the old attitudes. The new attitudes flourished in the context ofbroad changes in society, law, and medicine. All of these changes
evolved rapidly in the twentieth century. 28
B. Transitional Attitudes Toward Death

Tolstoy's 1886 novella, The Death of Ivan 1/yich, narrates the story
of one man's death. 29 The novella reflects an attitude toward death that
echoed that which had been-as well as that which would soon become-far more common. By this time, there were significant changes
in the personnel surrounding death. In place of, or at least alongside the
role once occupied by the priest, Aries points to that of the doctor. 30 By
the end of the nineteenth century, the process of medicalizing death had
begun. 31
Ironically, with the medicalization of death, came a fierce effort to
mask, and indeed to deny, death. With the prophetic vision of the great
novelist, Tolstoy, who wrote the story oflvan Ilyich's death at the end of
the nineteenth century, remarked on both the disguise of death and on its
medicalization. 32 The constancy of the pretense that surrounded the
death of Ivan Ilyich-that he was not dying when he clearly wassucceeded in "degrad[ing] the formidable and solemn act of [Ilyich's]
death." 33 Today, the tenacity of that lie and its frightful power to disguise the truth is abating, but it has not disappeared from contemporary
responses to dying. Tolstoy mined that lie. The narrative of the novella

!d.
Jd. at xvi ("Changes in man's attitude toward death either take place very slowly or
else occur between long periods of immobility. Contemporaries do not notice these changes
because these periods of immobility span several generations and thus exceed the capacity of
the collective memory.").
27
See ARIES, supra note 12, at 9.
28
See infra Part Ill.
29
LEO TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYICH AND OTHER SHORT STORIES (Rosemary
Edmonds trans., Penguin Books ed. 1989) ( 1886).
30
ARIES, supra note 12, at 564.
31
/d. at 563.
32
!d. at 567.
33
/d. (quoting TOLSTOY, supra note 29, at 142-43).
25

26
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focused not on Ilyich's death, but on Ilyich 's living, indeed Ilyich's
coming to life for the first time, as he combatted the lies imposed on the
process of his dying.
Almost a century after Tolstoy wrote The Death of Ivan Jlyich, a
French priest, Father Francois de Dainville, spoke with another priest
about a salient consequence of Dainville 's own medicalized dying:
"They are cheating me out of my own death." 34 Father Dainville died in
the early 1970s in a hospital's intensive-care unit, invaded by a myriad
of tubes aimed at sustaining life. 35 The lie that characterized Ilyich' s fictional dying can be equated with the lie about which Father Dainville
complained. The lies were of a similar sort. But the lie that compromised
Dainville' s dying was imposed in a new manner; it was a lie grounded in
the life-sustaining tubes that characterized Dainville' s dying and death.
The medicalization of dying-a process now defined by life-sustaining
technology 36-wrapped the end-point in a new variant of the lie that had
aimed to mask Ivan Ilyich's fictional death a century earlier.
The two variants-the effort to mask death (the lie, as it were)
along with the prolongation of dying through the use of life-sustaining
treatments merged in the twentieth century with the routine hospitalization of dying people. In 1900, most people in the United States died at
home; however, by the start of the twentieth century, most died in hospitals.37 The hospital death facilitated society's interest in hiding death
from the public gaze. And by the middle of the twentieth century, increasingly effective forms of life-sustaining care within hospitals encouraged the myth that death, much like disease, could be conquered by
science and technology.
Thus, in the worlds inhabited by Roland, Tristan, and the Knights
of the Round Table, a dying person was expected to intuit his own death
and to announce death's arrival. 38 That attitude toward death survived
into the eighteenth century. 39 But soon, alternative attitudes toward death
were competing with those that defined death during the previous millennium.
34

ARIES, supra note 12, at 567.
!d. at 572.
36
See infra Part III.B.
37
See Dale Lupu, Hospice, Palliative Care and Health Care Reform: beyond "end of
life"
to
quality
of life,
GEO.
WASH.
U.,
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH,
http:/!hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 0 I 8&context=sphhs_pol icy_fac
pres (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
38
See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
39
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
35
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Soon, the medicalization of death-which began even before the
development of sophisticated life-sustaining technology-rendered dying as significant as death for most people. By the twentieth century,
these new attitudes toward death and the increased significance paid to
the period of dying harmonized with the move toward a society in which
large segments of the population found themselves (or chose to be)
largely bereft of religious and other traditional anchors. Further, the traditional approach to death as described by Aries was transformed by
new understandings of personhood, focused on autonomous individuality rather than on community and connection. 40
C. Contemporary Attitudes Toward Death and Dying in the United
States

Yet, curiously some aspects of the methods through which contemporary Americans are urged to prepare for dying and death (for instance,
through attention to advance care planning in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries) might seem to be a modem equivalent of the hope
or expectation of the ancient and medieval worlds that death warn dying
people of its approach. 41 The differences are fundamental, of course, but
still some similarities can be noted, even as contemporary law and medicine have responded with a distinctly modem idiom.
1. The Old and the New, Compared
The "good death" of previous centuries-one that relied on dreams
and visions to warn a person about to die as death arrived42-is neither
common nor deemed better than other deaths by the contemporary
world. That antiquated vision of death was grounded on assumptions
about the after-world and religious powers that survive only in pockets

40

In the second half of the twentieth century, society broadly displaced "traditional" values that defined family relationships and doctor-patient relationships in tenns that valued hierarchy and community with values that focused on relationships through the lens of autonomous individuality. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 105 (2014) (noting significance of individualism to world of health
care as a focus that impoverishes the notion of community and displaces it with a notion of
autonomous relationships); see also Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes,
and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 347, 354-66 (2008) (considering these cultural shifts in context of twentieth century family).
41
See supra Part ll.A.
42
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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of the largely secular, contemporary United States. 43 The preface to the
Institute of Medicine's 20 14 report on dying in America notes that
"(f]ew people really have the opportunity to know when their death will
occur."44
At least one important function lurking in an earlier age's commitment to a notion of the "good death" has parallels in the modem world.
These parallels attempt-as did the notion of a good death in Europe in
earlier centuries-to make sense of death, to presume an order of a
blessed sort when faced with the potential chaos death might suggest.
Although death no longer warns as impressively as it once did, physicians and nurses may be aware that a patient will soon die. There is still
reluctance among physicians to advise patients that death will likely
soon arrive, even when physicians are aware of that reality. 45 Increasingly, however, they are being encouraged to be forthright with dying patients or patients' loved ones in the event that the patient is not able to
communicate or understand medical information. 46 Elisabeth KublerRoss documents another instance of modernity's awareness of death's
proximity with her delineation of the stages of responding to death' s approach.47
Even more than these examples, advance care planning offers a
plan for the good death in the twenty-first century. That death, as defined
by Ellen Goodman, a founder of the Conversation Project, 48 contrasts
with a "hard death." The good death is one in which the patient's "wishes were expressed and respected. Whether they'd had a conversation
about how they wanted to live toward the end." 49 Both the notion of the
good death of the medieval world and the planned-for death (or rather,
dying) of the contemporary world presume the preservation of a social
43

Philippe Aries reports on sociological studies that showed that members of contemporary Christian society have continued to have faith in God more often and more fully than they
have continued to believe in an afterlife. ARJES, supra note 12, at 573. Aries further reports,
however, that belief in an afterlife is more common among dying people than among others in
the population. /d.
44
lNST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND
HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE, at xi (2014) (hereinafter
DYING IN AMERICA].
45
/d. at 159.
46
ARIES, supra note 12, at 589-90.
47
See ELISABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 31-91 (Routledge ed. 2009)
(1969) (noting that the stages of responding to death are denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance).
48
See infra Part VI.A.
49
Ellen Goodman, Opinion, How to Talk About Dying, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July
I, 20 15), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/20 15/07/0 1/how-to-talk-about-dying/.
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order and some control over it, death notwithstanding.
2. New Attitudes Toward Life, New Attitudes Toward Death
Modernity's understandings of a good death have been shaped in
response to challenges created by life-sustaining medical technology,
developed in the middle years of the twentieth century. That development furthered the medicalization of dying, which began in the late nineteenth century, long before the appearance of life-sustaining technology.
By the second half of the twentieth century, the process of dying in hospitals offered discomforting images to patients' families and friends, as
well as even to patients' health care providers. Yet, too often those images were not acknowledged by health care professionals, leaving family
members confused and helpless.
By the second half of the twentieth century, American medicine,
which had made stunning strides in treating illness, 50 seemed increasingly anxious to "treat" dying with the "miracles" of modem medicine"miracles" such as antibiotics, dialysis, vaccines, and new surgical possibilities51-as if it were but another serious illness. Even as virtually
everyone knew that death had not been, and could not be, conquered, it
began to seem as if dying could-and sometimes should-be prolonged
for years and even decades. 52 That vision harmonized with a vision of a
new medicine that could advance without limits. But soon, medical professionals as well as the loved ones of dying patients began to question
the wisdom of unrelieved aggressive care for dying patients, especially
for those dying in pain. 53

50
See Andrew M. Knoll, The Reawakening of Complementary and Alternative Medicine
at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Filling the Void in Conventional Biomedicine, 20 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 329, 350 (2004) (noting significance of development of "antibiotics, vaccines, improved surgical technique, and a multitude of other innovations").
51
See End of Life in America, ENDLINK: RESOURCE FOR END OF LIFE CARE

EDUCATION,
ROBERT
H.
LURIE COMPREHENSIVE
CANCER
CTR.,
NW.
U.,
http://endoflife.northwestem.edu/introduction/what.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 20 I 6); see also
Knoll, supra note 50, at 350.
52
See End of Life in America, supra note 5 I .
53
See, e.g., Ken Murray, How Doctors Die: It's Not Like the Rest of Us, But it Should
ZOCALO
PUB.
SQUARE:
NEXUS,
(Nov.
30,
2011),
Be,
http://www.zocaiopublicsquare.org/2011111/30/how-doctors-die/ideas/nexus/; see also ir!fra
Part IV.D.
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DEATH AND DYING: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, SOCIAL CHANGE,
AND MEDICAL INNOVATIONS

Before reviewing broad changes in the law that encouraged people
to engage in advance care planning by the end of the twentieth century,
this Part examines shifts in the demographics of dying and death that accompanied changes in social understandings of those matters. The most
significant changes in this regard include increases in the average
lifespan, with death often preceded by long periods of chronic illness,
and, correlatively, the extension of the process of dying. This Part reviews those changes and notes several medical developments that facilitated the demographic changes.

A. Shifting Patterns of Dying and Death
The average lifespan in the United States increased from 47 years
in 1900 to 75 years in 2000. 54 Death during childhood was far more
common in the early decades of the twentieth century than it was in the
last part of the century. 55 Before World War II, many people who survived childhood lived into their sixties, but far fewer of them than is the
case today lived into their eighties and nineties. 56
As the average lifespan expanded, society increasingly assumed
that death, though inevitable, would occur only years in the future. Even
clinicians were beset with concern that they failed their profession and
their patients if they could not "save their patients from death." 57 Many
physicians, reflecting on, and perhaps also furthering, society's shifting
presumptions about death, accepted "the control of death as [their] mission in life."58 Even today, over a quarter of adults in the United States
have given almost no thought to their own deaths. 59 And a large percentage of the population has not completed advance care planning documents.60 A 2013 survey of adults forty years of age or older found that
less than half of that population had signed advance-directive forms. 61
This is the case even though images of a hospital death are both
54

See Lupu, supra note 37.
See End ofLife in America, supra note 51 .
56
See id.
57 !d.
58
ARIES, supra note 12, at 586 (writing about the second half of the twentieth century).
59
DYING IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 3.
60
/d. at II.
61
!d. at 127 tb1.3-l.
55
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familiar and discomforting to most people, especially those who have
visited dying friends or family members not enrolled in hospice or palliative care. More than three decades ago, Philippe Aries remarked that
people in the modem world do not generally imagine the manner of their
own deaths. 62 They are, however, privy to hospital scenes of death that
involve friends and loved ones "dying in a tangle of tubes all over [the]
body, breathing artificially."63
Palliative care and hospice care offer options to very sick patients
not comfortable with aggressive care. Yet, even as clinicians and the
public seem ready to forego CPR and assistance with nutrition at the end
of life, the nation has not witnessed a widespread pattern of less aggressive care for terminal patients. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, although a higher percent of people aged 65 and older died at home
than in the previous decade and a half, 64 utilization of intensive care
units by patients at or near the end of life increased. 65
B. Medical Developments
The average lifespan in the U.S. increased in the twentieth century
as a result of various new medications, as well as improved sanitation,
and other public health efforts. 66 In particular, the availability of antibiotics by the 1940s gave medicine a powerful tool for controlling infectious diseases. 67 Diseases such as pneumonia to which elderly people
had often succumbed, comparatively free of distress, became treatable
conditions. As a result patients with a slew of life-threatening conditions
lived to linger, connected to life-sustaining technology.
The modem intensive care unit ("ICU") emerged in the 1960s. 68 Its
creation was more or less coincident with the development of new

62

ARIES, supra note 12, at 593.

63

!d.

64
Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries: Site of
Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 JAMA 470,

470 (2013) (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2010:
WITH
SPECIAL
FEATURE
ON
DEATH
AND
DYING
42,
http:llwww.cdc.govlnchsldata/hus/husiO.pdf
(last
accessed
Nov.
24,
2011)),
http:lljama.jamanetwork.comlarticle.aspx?articleid=l568250. The report compared deaths at
home in 1989 with those in 2007. !d.
65
See id. at 4 73 tbl.2.
66
End of Life in America, supra note 51.
67
68

See id.

John J. Marini, Mechanical Ventilation: Past Lessons and the Near Future, 17
CRITICAL CARE, Supp. I, 2013, at I, http://www.ccforum.com/content/17 IS I IS I.
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modes of providing ventilator support for patients with diminished respiratory function. 69 This development, along with that of percutaneous
gastrostomy ("PEG") tubes for feeding patients unable to swallow, revolutionized life-sustaining care for terribly sick and dying patients. 70
By the 1930s, so called iron lungs-essentially tanks that surrounded patients' upper bodies-provided respiratory support to some patients, but these machines could not compensate for complete respiratory
failure, and they were most effective for patients who were conscious. 7 I
By the 1960s, positive-pressure ventilation replaced the iron lung in
newly fashioned ICUs. 72 Throughout the last decades of the twentieth
century and into the twenty-first century, technological developments
offered patients improved modes of respiratory support. 73
Development of feeding tubes (enteral feeding) that could easily be
inserted into a patient's body further facilitated sustaining life for very ill
and dying people. Enteral feeding provides nutrition to patients without
the ability to swallow or swallow easily. 74 PEG tubes/ 5 developed by
two Cleveland physicians in 1979, offered a viable alternative to feeding
tubes that required surgery, accompanied by anesthesia. 76 The two physicians who developed PEG tubes intended them to be used for pediatric
patients who had difficulty swallowing. 77 They specifically aimed to
create a feeding tube that would eliminate the risks of surgery and anesthesia for young children and babies. 78 About 25 years after the first use
69

/d. at 2.
See Sylvia Kuo et al., Natural History of Feeding Tube Use in Nursing Home Residents with Advanced Dementia, 10 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS Ass'N 264 (May 2009),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC273 3212/.
71
See Marini, supra note 68, at I.
70

/d.
/d. at 3. Ventilators currently cost about $40,000, but low-cost ventilators are being
developed. These promise to be especially useful in planning for and responding to pandemics. See Kris Newby, Another Biodesign Success: Researchers Develop Low-cost Medical
Ventilators for Global Disasters, STAN. MED.: NEWS CTR. (Feb. 14, 2011),
https://med. stanford. edulnews/all-news/20 11/02/another-bi ode sign -success-researchersdevelop-low-cost-medical-ventilators-for-global-disasters.html.
74
Sylvia Kuo et al., Natural History of Feeding Tube Use in Nursing Home Residents
with Advanced Dementia, 10 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS'N 264 (May 2009),
http://www. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2 733212/.
75
/d. PEG tubes were originally used on pediatric patients to avoid the problems of inserting feeding tubes through laparotomies. /d.
76
Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy, CASE W. RESERVE U., DITTRICK MED. HIST.
CTR.,
http://artsci.case.eduldittrick/online-exhibits/explore-the-artifacts/percutaneousendoscopic-gastrostomy-1979/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
77 /d.
72

73

78/d.
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of the PEG tube, its developers opined that its use had far exceeded their
intentions. 79 In a 2006 news story about the use of PEG tubes for patients such as Terri Schiavo (a young woman, diagnosed as having been
in a persistent vegetative state for many years), 80 the developers of the
PEG tube expressed concern. Their concern centered on the ethical dilemmas occasioned by the availability of PEG tubes for persistently vegetative patients who could not breathe or eat without life-sustaining
tubes in place but who could now be kept alive for decades if connected
to such tubes. 81
Further, there is growing consensus that feeding tubes are not recommended even for some patients with significant difficulty swallowing, and that they may not routinely improve outcomes. 82 Studies have
challenged the use of feeding tubes, for instance, for patients with advanced dementia. 83 A variety of other end-of-life treatments and responses, including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation ("CPR"), continues to
be provided to dying patients even in situations in which a patient's
treating clinicians view the care being provided as essentially futile. 84
As a result of the availability of such modes of treatment for dying
patients (including ventilators, PEG tubes, and CPR), clinicians, patients, and family members of patients face a series of challenges about
medical decision making for patients who lack the capacity to make their
own decisions. Who should make such decisions and how they should
be made have emerged as some of the most discomforting and controversial issues that have been occasioned by developments in treatment
and medical technology that offer life-sustaining care to dying patients.
Patients, if capable, have the right to participate actively in medical
79
Joe Milicia, Creators of Tube Technique Didn't Foresee Dilemma, BOSTON.COM,
(Mar.
27,
2005),
http://www.boston.com/news/nationlarticles/2005/03/27/
creators_of_tube_technique_didnt_foresee_dilemma/.
80
See infra Part IV.B.I.c.3.
81
Milicia, supra note 79.
82
See Kuo et al., supra note 74.
83
See id.
84
Gina Kolata, Murky Path in Deciding on Care at the End, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9004E I OF 173AF930A 15751 COA96690886
3. In ICUs, it is not unusual to find patients given aggressive care even though the patient's
clinicians concluded days or even weeks earlier that the treatment would not return the patient
to health. /d. (quoting Dr. Paul R. Helft, an oncologist at the Indiana University School of
Medicine). On the other hand, aggressive care, including CPR for patients almost certain to
die with or without CPR can offer emotional support to survivors who believe that "everything" was done for their loved one. !d. Such care is for families (or even sometimes for clinicians), not for patients, and may even substitute for care that would better serve a patient's
survivors. /d. (referring to comments by Dr. Robert Truog).
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decisions about their care. Many dying patients as well as patients diagnosed as persistently vegetative, however, are without capacity or have
diminished capacity to make medical decisions. The majority of court
cases involving end-of-life decision making have been occasioned by
disputes between a patient's loved ones and health care providers 85 or
among a patient's loved ones. 86
IV. SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO DEATH AND DYING
The law's responses to decision making for patients without capacity grew out of the jurisprudence of informed consent, implemented in
the last three decades of the twentieth century. The law has struggled to
shape appropriate responses for patients without capacity. This Part reviews the development of legal responses to decision making for patients
who lack the capacity to make their own decisions.

A. Informed Consent and Patient Autonomy
Development of the informed consent doctrine followed from the
increasingly important notion in the last decades of the twentieth century
that the physician-patient relationship should reflect patient autonomy
and individuality at least as much as physician authority. 87 More than a
half-century earlier, the kernel of the informed consent doctrine was
shaped by Judge (later Justice) Cardozo in a case in which he obligated
physicians to obtain a patient's consent before operating on that patient.88 Judge Cardozo's decision in Schloendorffdid not require the patient's clinicians to provide her with information about her condition and
about the care recommended. 89 The decision offered an assessment of
85

See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976) (allowing the father of a woman in persistent vegetative state to make medical decisions, including decision to terminate
ventilator care, for his daughter).
86
See, e.g., Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (lith Cir. 2005). The
case of Terri Schiavo is discussed infra Part IV.B.3.
87
At about the same time, the doctrine of informed consent became central to any effort
to conduct ethical biomedical research involving human subjects. See ALBERT R. JONSEN,
THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 334-35 (1998); Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human
Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 15 (1994); see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the "Patient": Shifts in Attitudes About Consent, Genetic Information, and Commercialization in
Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 150 (2005).
88
Schloendorffv. Soc'y ofN.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled by Bing
v. Thunig 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Schloendorffwas later overruled but the opinion expressed by Justice Cardozo helped spurn the development of the informed consent doctrine.
89
See id. at 95.

QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW

252

[Vol. 34:235

the value of patient consent, however, that later became important in the
development of the informed consent doctrine. Judge Cardozo intoned:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages." 90
The notion gained little attention for over four decades. Then in
1957, a California court used the term "informed consent," apparently
for the first time in reference to the medical arena. 91 The court required
physicians to provide patients with "facts which are necessary to form
the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment."92
Fifteen years passed before courts and legislatures formulated concrete rules for determining the scope of the informed consent requirement. Canterbury v. Spence, 93 decided in 1972 by a federal court, offered a broad interpretation of the informed consent doctrine. 94 After
Canterbury, courts 95 and legislatures96 throughout the nation institutionalized the notion that a patient's consent to medical care must reflect autonomous choice, deemed impossible unless the patient has been informed about the scope and implications of his or her health condition

90

!d. at 93.
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
92
!d. In distinction with later rules about infonned consent, the Salgo court significantly
limited the reach of its rule. The court stressed the significance of physician "discretion" to
withhold information. !d. Jay Katz noted an inconsistency between the rule and its qualification. The rule, as qualified, Katz explained, imposed an impossible obligation on doctors to
reveal all relevant facts and to withhold facts that could be upsetting to patients. See Jay Katz,
Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 137, 138 (1977).
93
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
94
Jd. at 787. In the same year in which the circuit court for the District of Columbia decided Canterbury v. Spence, the California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
another informed consent case. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I, 10-11 (Cal. 1972). In Cobbs,
the California court required physicians to give patients information on which a consent or
refusal could be predicated and concluded that a jury (without need for expert testimony on
the informed consent issue) was positioned to decide whether the information communicated
to the patient by the physician was adequate. !d.
95
See, e.g., Conkel v. VanPelt, No. 87-1658, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 20340 (4th Cir.
Aug. 2, 1988); Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1098-99 (D. Conn. 1984); MillerMcGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 439-44 (D.C. 2007); Howard v. Univ. of Med. &
Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73 (N.J. 2002).
96
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2015) (limiting the right of
action to recover for medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice based on a lack of informed
consent).
91
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and about the care being recommended. 97
B. Respecting Patient "Autonomy": Patients Without Capacity
The informed consent doctrine rests on the presumption that a basic
respect owed to patients obligates health care professionals to inform a
patient about his or her medical condition and about recommended medical tests and treatments before seeking patient consent to care. 98 It predicates implementation of care on patients' informed agreement. 99 The
presumption that guided development of the informed consent doctrine
cannot be applied easily to the situation of patients who lack decisionmaking capacity.
Yet, soon after the law clearly framed the informed consent doctrine, courts faced with cases involving very ill patients without capacity
or permanently unconscious patients crafted an alternative response that
paid homage to the informed consent doctrine while re-shaping its parameters for application to these patient populations. This response depended on the authorization of surrogate decision makers who were directed to effect the principal's wishes where those had been delineated
or to act in the principal's best interest in cases in which the principal
had not expressed his or her preferences for health care decisions relevant to the actual medical situation that pertained.
Much of this law was voiced by judges before it was entertained by
legislatures. In addressing areas of life that implicate significant social
challenges-disputes, for instance, about end-of-life care or care for persistently vegetative patients as well as disputes about a variety of domestic matters, including those occasioned by reproductive technologycourts often render decisions before legislators respond adequately or at
all. 100 There are many reasons for this. Among them, courts do not generally have the option, enjoyed to a greater extent by legislators, of postponing consideration of controversial matters. 101
97

Well-recognized exceptions to the requirement that patients consent to care before it is
provided include emergency situations. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89.
98
Martin R. Stroder, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protecting the Patient's Right
to Make Informed Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 85, 87, 92 (1987).
99
/d. at 86.
100
In such cases, especially those involving disputes occasioned by reproductive technology, judges often implore state legislatures to entertain and provide statutory rules to channel
the issues at stake. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998); In reMarriage
of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); In re Adoption of Baby Girl
L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813,818 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1986).
101
Lloyd Duhaime, Delay in Reasons for Judgment: Justice Delayed is Justice Denied,
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The first important decision by a state's highest court that responded to such a dispute involved the case of Karen Ann Quinlan in the New
Jersey courts. Quinlan 102 was decided in 1976, and is one among anumber of cases that were occasioned by a request to discontinue lifesustaining care for a patient without capacity. 103 A number of similar
cases received widespread media attention in the last decades of the
twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first century. 104 Perhaps because Quinlan was the first of these cases decided by a state's
highest court, it brought public attention to the issues at stake. 105 Even
more, Quinlan was the first of a set of cases, including Cruzan 106 and
Schiavo 107 that involved disputes regarding the continuation of lifesustaining care for someone in a persistent vegetative state. This Section
will focus on three of these cases, that of Karen Quinlan, that of Nancy
Cruzan, a Missouri case considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990,
and that of Terri Schiavo (decided in Florida in the early twenty-first
century). 108 Then the Section considers statutory responses to the dilemmas presented by end-of-life medical decision making.
1. Quinlan and its Context
The story of Karen Ann Quinlan was not the first disagreement
made known to the public between the loved ones of an incapable, dying
patient and the hospital in which that patient was being cared for. In
1957, a widow, publishing anonymously in the Atlantic Monthly, wrote
about her husband's death in a hospital:

DUHAIME'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA
L.
(Apr.
5,
2011),
http://www .duhaime.org/LegaiResources/Civil Litigation/Law Article-12 70/Delay-in-Reasonsfor-Judgment-Justice-Delayed-is-Justice-Denied.aspx.
102
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
103
See id. at 653.
104
1n addition to Quinlan, see, for example, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990); and Schiavo ex ref. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla.
2005). A suggestive, and potentially troubling, aspect of the three cases-though one beyond
the scope of this Article-is the widespread media attention given to these cases (but not others), in that each of the three involved a young, middle-class, white woman, rendered vegetative in the prime of her life.
105
See David Masci, The Right-to-Die Debate and the Tenth Anniversary of Oregon's
Death
with
Dignity
Act,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Oct.
9,
2007),
http://www.pewforum.org/2007/I0/09/the-right-to-die-debate-and-the-tenth-anniversary-oforegons-death-with-dignity-act/.
106
Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
107
Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378.
108
Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261; Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378; Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
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As [the dead] fight for spiritual release, and are constantly dragged back by
modem medicine to try again, does their agony augment? To those who stand
and watch, this seems like a ghastly imposition against God's will be done.
Apparently there is no mercy which the family may bestow at such a time. 109

An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine in the same
year recommended that all physicians read the anonymously authored
Atlantic Monthly essay .110 The editorial explained:
Today's [medical school] graduate falls heir-and with no extra effort-to the
immaculate, modem aseptic skills that can keep a diseased, half-dead, cancerous body alive, by intravenous nourishment and with the magic of penicillin
and round-the-clock special nursing, so long that the doctor may emerge in the
eyes of kin with little resemblance to the wise and understanding family physician of yesteryear. 111

The widow who wrote A Way of Dying, to which the 1957 New
England Journal of Medicine editorial referred, did not initiate a legal
case with the hope of changing the sort of care her dying husband was
receiving! 12 Her husband's physician explained that continuing care,
even for dying, delirious, or unconscious patients (viewed as "torture"
by the anonymous author of the Atlantic Monthly essay), was necessary
to sustain life. 113 When a nurse arrived, ready to give the author's husband medication, the wife-author, though wanting to kick the nurse from
the room, "staggered" out herself. 114 "There was," she explained, "nothing else to do." 115
a. Karen Quinlan 's Story
In contrast, the parents of Karen Quinlan, Joseph and Julia Quinlan,
decided to seek judicial help in their effort to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn from their daughter's body. Joseph Quinlan, Karen's
father, sought a declaratory judgment against New Jersey, the county,

109

See Editorial, Life-in-Death, 256 N. ENG. J. MED. 760, 760 (1957) (quoting Anonymous, A Way ofDying, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1957, at 53).
110

/d.

!d.
112
See M.L. Tina Stevens, What Quinlan Can Tell Kevorkian About the Right to Die,
HUMANIST, Mar. I, 1997, at 10--11.
113
See id. at I I.
114
See id. (quoting A Way of Dying, supra note 109).
115
See id. (quoting A Way of Dying, supra note 109).
Ill
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the treating physicians, and the hospital caring for Karen. 116 He requested appointment as his daughter's guardian and further, asked that the
court expressly grant him authority to "discontinu[e] ... all extraordinary means of sustaining the vital processes of his daughter. " 117
The sudden failure of Karen Quinlan's health occurred in the spring
of 197 5 when Karen, then 21 years old, unexpectedly collapsed. 118
Friends called an ambulance irnmediately. 119 By the time that the ambulance arrived at a local hospital, Karen had been without oxygen for two
15-minute periods. 120 The cause of her collapse was never discerned. 121
All parties agreed that Karen was completely unable to participate in decisions concerning her care. 122 Karen's treating neurologist testified at
trial that he could not prognosticate about Karen's future with certainty
but he was unaware of any treatment that would rehabilitate her and did
not "see how her condition [could] be reversed." 123
The trial court relied on Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 124 a
1971 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, and rejected Joseph Quinlan's claim, offered on behalf of his daughter that she enjoyed a constitutional "right to die" and that this right supported his effort to have their
daughter's life-sustaining care withdrawn. 125 Judge Muir, writing for the
trial court, described all of the defendants as having viewed the potential
termination of Quinlan's life support as "homicide and an act of euthanasia." 126
Further, Judge Muir grounded his decision to reject Joseph Quinlan's petition on his understanding of the role of the physician. 127 He explained:
There is a higher standard, a higher duty, that encompasses the uniqueness of
human life, the integrity of the medical profession and the attitude of society
toward the physician, and therefore the morals of society. A patient is placed,
or places himself, in the care of a physician with the expectation that he (the

116

In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 80I, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
!d. Although Karen received nutrition through a naso-gastric tube, no request seems
ever to have been made to terminate that care. !d. at 808.
118
!d. at 806.
119
Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 806.
120 !d.
121 !d.
122 !d.
123
Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 8 I I.
124
279A.2d670(N.J. 1971).
125
Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 814.
117

126/d.
127

!d. at 818.
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physician) will do everything in his power, everything that is known to modem
medicine, to protect the patient's life. He will do all within his human power to
favor life against death. 128

Accordingly, Judge Muir placed great importance on the view of
Dr. Morse, Karen's neurologist, that "medical tradition" could not "justify" the removal of Karen's ventilator . 129
The trial court's response to Karen's pre-incapacity assertion, reported to the court by Karen's mother, that she would not want to be
kept alive in a situation similar to the one in which she existed, deserves
note. 130 The court essentially interpreted Karen's reported preference as
the musings of a young woman (20 years old at the time), who was "full
of life" and had not seriously contemplated her own death. 131 Judge
Muir's view in Quinlan is significant as an historical matter. It suggests
the remarkable shift in social and legal views of advance care planning
(views that gainsay Judge Muir's position) that emerged even as soon as
the state supreme court's decision in Quinlan.
b.

Quinlan in New Jersey's Highest Court

Justice Hughes, writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court, 132 noted
early in his opinion that Karen's physicians as well as experts who testified at trial all agreed that to withdraw respiratory support from Karen
would conflict with "medical practices, standards and traditions." 133 Yet,
Justice Hughes, in a remarkable decision reflecting, and perhaps shaping, responses in the decades to follow rather than those extant when he
wrote Quinlan, named Karen's father as guardian for his daughter and
expressly provided authority for him to request termination of respiratory support for Karen. 134 That authority was conditioned by Joseph Quinlan's obtaining the agreement of the hospital's "'Ethics Committee' or
like body" and by the consensus of Karen's physicians that there was
"no reasonable possibility" of her "emerging from her . . . comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state." 135

128

/d. (footnote omitted).
Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 818.
130 /d.
131 /d.
132
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
133
/d. at 655.
134
/d. at 671.
135
/d. at 672.
129
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Justice Hughes' decision conflicted with the almost unanimous
view among physicians at the time regarding the withdrawal of lifesustaining care. 136 It was not considered acceptable medical practice to
withdraw life support from a patient who was not brain dead. 137 Dr. Sidney Diamond, an expert witness for the State, testified that withholding
or withdrawing respiratory support from Karen was outside the parameters of ethical medical practice. 138 Dr. Morse, Karen's treating neurologist agreed. 139 Yet, when the Quinlans, who were practicing Catholics,
consulted with their priest and with the hospital's chaplain, both assured
them that their Church's tenets supported their wish to have Karen's respiratory support terminated. 140
Justice Hughes affirmed that were Karen competent, she would
have enjoyed the right to request termination of life-sustaining care. 141
Fourteen years later, that position was "assumed" by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep 't of Health. 142 Further, Justice Hughes
noted-while at the same time acknowledging that testimony about previous conversations between Karen and her friends did not provide probative evidence regarding Karen's views on life-sustaining care-he was
absolutely sure that were Karen competent just long enough to assess her
situation and her prognosis, she would ask that respiratory support be
discontinued. 143 Thus, he concluded that Karen's privacy right to refuse
care would be vitiated were it not transferred to her father, whom the
court viewed as a fit guardian for his daughter. 144
Karen's physicians testified at trial that she would likely not survive
for long without the respirator. 145 After Judge Hughes' decision, Karen's
father authorized withdrawal of Karen's respiratory support. 146 Karen
136

In Quinlan, itself, all of Karen's doctors as well as the hospital and the state, opposed
Joseph Quinlan's effort to have life-sustaining care for his daughter withdrawn. See Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647.
137
/d. at 656.
138
/d. at 657.
139 /d.
140
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 658. The court noted that it entertained the views of the Catholic
Church only insofar as those views bore on Joseph Quinlan's "character, motivations and purposes as relevant to his qualification and suitability as guardian." /d. at 660.
141
/d. at 663.
142
497 U.S. 261,279 (1990).
143
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
144
!d. at 664, 671.
145
!d. at 655.
146
See Robert D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of '76 Right to Die
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1985), http:/lwww.nytimes.com/1985/06/12/nyregion/karen-annquin1an-31-dies-focus-of-76-right-to-die-case.html?pagewanted=all.

2016]

CONTEXTUALIZING ADVANCE CARE PLANNING

259

was successfully weaned from the respirator and lived for almost a decade.147 She died of pneumonia in 1985. 148

c.

Confusion About the Meaning ofDeath: "Brain Death"

Initially, Joseph Quinlan's petition to the New Jersey Superior
Court for appointment as his daughter's guardian described Karen as already dead. 149 Later, he acknowledged that Karen "[was] not dead 'according to any legal standard recognized by the State of New Jersey. "' 150
The Quinlan case commenced less than a decade after an Ad Hoc Committee at the Harvard Medical School defined "brain death" as an alternative to cessation of respiration and cardiac activity for establishing
death. 151 The criteria delineated in the Ad Hoc Committee's report for
establishing brain death included the absence of breathing, movement,
and reflexes that could be elicited, as well as a flat electroencephalogram
(repeated 24 hours after the first test, with no change ). 152 Yet, the Ad
Hoc Committee's delineation of "brain death" left many people confused.
Justice Hughes expressly noted in Quinlan that new technology had
obscured traditional understandings of death. 153 Although Karen was not
brain dead, the possibility of declaring someone dead whose heart continued to pump blood (albeit with technological assistance) had opened
up a slew of possibilities heretofore not easily imaginable. Not only, for
instance, did the parents' original petition in Quinlan contend that Karen
was dead, but others, reviewing the Quinlans' story, have agreed with
that contention. 154 Arguing that Karen should have been declared dead
before the respirator was withdrawn, one critic explained:
The currently accepted criteria of death, one must conclude, are underin147
Jill Lepore, The Politics of Death, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/I 1/30/the-politics-of-death.
148 !d.
149
In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
150 /d.
151
See Henry K. Beecher et al., A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 33839 (1968).
152
!d. at 337-38.
153
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 656 (N.J. 1976).
154
See Jay Alexander Gold, Book Review, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 93-94 (1977-78) (reviewing I IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN: THE COMPLETE LEGAL BRIEFS, COURT
PROCEEDINGS, AND DECISION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY (1975) and 2 IN THE
MA TIER OF KAREN QUINLAN: THE COMPLETE BRIEFS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND OPINION OF
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT ( 1976)).
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elusive. The influential Harvard Report sanctions pronouncement of death
once there is irreversible coma, which exists, according to the Report, when
there is no discernible central nervous system activity. But if we accept that the
essential qualities of life are cognitivity and sapience, our criteria for death
may be broadened. Death, we may say, shall be pronounced when there is no
longer any reasonable possibility of a present or future co¥nitive, sapient state,
55
whether or not the nervous system shows signs of activity.

2.

Cruzan

In 1990 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a Missouri case
that involved another young woman who became persistently vegetative-in Nancy Cruzan's case, the result of an automobile accident. 156
Nancy's parents, much like Karen's parents before them, requested that
life-sustaining care be withdrawn. 157 Missouri courts required clear and
convincing evidence that a patient without capacity would have wanted
the withdrawal of life-sustaining care before such care could be withdrawn.158 The Missouri courts read that standard stringently. 159
Unlike Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy was able to breathe without respiratory support. 160 Nancy's parents asked that her feeding tube be withdrawn.161 The hospital sought court approval for the withdrawal. 162 Invoking a state policy "favoring life," the Missouri Supreme Court,
overruling the trial court decision, held against Nancy's parents. 163 The
Cruzans challenged the Missouri decision in the United States Supreme
Court. 164
Cruzan is the only Supreme Court case focused on the right of a
surrogate decision maker to refuse end-of-life care, and the implications
of its holding have been difficult to interpret. The case has probably
been most important for the Court's "assumption" that capable adults
have the right to refuse care or to have life-sustaining care withdrawn. 165

ISS
1 6

/d. at 93.

s See id. at 266.

1 7

s !d. at 267.
!d. at 265.
19
s See Crnzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
16
Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988).
161
/d. at410.
162 !d.
163
!d. at 426.
164
Crnzan, 497 U.S. at 265.
16
s The "right to die" that some read into the Crnzan decision was called into question
after the Court's 1997 decision in Washington v. G/ucksberg, involving a possible right to
physician assisted death. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (refusing to recognize right to physician assisISB

°
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Even the implications of that assertion, however, were not transparent
insofar as the Court "assumed," but did not expressly declare, a competent adult's right to refuse life-sustaining care.
In any event, the issue at stake in the Cruzan case went beyond any
assertion about the right of a capable patient to participate in his or her
medical decisions in that Cruzan involved the right of a surrogate decision maker to enjoy the same authority that a capable patient enjoys. 166
Here, the Court sided with Missouri, against Nancy's parents. 167
We think it self-evident that the interests at stake in the instant proceedings are
more substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those involved
in a run-of-the-mine civil dispute. But not only does the [clear and convincing
evidence] standard of proof [set by Missouri] reflect the importance of a particular adjudication, it also serves as "a societal judgment about how the risk of
error should be distributed between the litigants." 168

The Court's decision in Cruzan permits, but does not require, states
to demand clear and convincing evidence 169 of a patient's preincompetency wishes before permitting a surrogate to authorize withdrawal of life-sustaining care. Interestingly, a subsequent proceeding in
Missouri, brought by Nancy's parents on the basis of new evidence
about Nancy's pre-incompetency wishes, resulted in a Missouri court
finding that the requirements of the state's clear and convincing evidence standard had been met. 170 Subsequently, Nancy's feeding tube was
withdrawn. 171 She died in late 1990. 172

tance suicide (or death)).
166
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
167
!d. at 265.
168
!d. at 283.
169
!d. at 283-84. Although a number of states apply a standard of clear and convincing
evidence to disputes about the withdrawal of life-sustaining care, only two--Missouri and
New York-traditionally interpreted the standard with great stringency. New York's law
changed dramatically in 1990 with passage of the Health Care Proxy Act, 1990 N.Y Sess.
Laws 752 (McKinney) (codified as N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2981 (McKinney 2015)), and
again in 2010 with passage of the Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA), 2010 N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 8 (McKinney) (codified as N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2994-a et seq. (McKinney 2015)).
170
James H. Lawlor III, The Right to Die in Illinois in the Wake ofCruzan, Longeway,
and Greenspan, 79 ILL. B.J. 72, 76n.65 (1991).
171
Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.cornll990/12/27/us/nancy-cruzan-dies-outlivedby-a-debate-over-the-right-to-die.htrnl.
172
!d.; Lawlor, supra note 170, at 76 n.65.
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3. Schiavo
The story of Terri Schiavo resembles those of Karen Quinlan and
Nancy Cruzan in that all of them were young, healthy, white, middleclass women, and all of them were in their twenties when they entered
into a persistent vegetative state from which they never emerged. In two
of the cases-those involving Karen Ann Quinlan and Terri Schiavothe cause was never clarified with certainty. 173 Terri Schiavo's story,
however, departs from that of Karen Ann Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan in
that the dispute that brought the case to court was between family members-in particular, Terri's parents on one side and her husband on the
other-rather than between family members and the patient's health care
providers. 174
State and federal courts entertained a variety of questions occasioned by the dispute between Terri Schiavo's parents and her husband
over a period of many years before Terri's death in 2005. 175 The Schiavo
story garnered significant public attention, especially in the few years
before Terri's death. 176 Unlike the Quinlan case, and more like the case
of Nancy Cruzan, the legal saga that defined Terri Schiavo's last twelve
years of life, made little new law. 177 The Schiavo narrative, however,
provides a view of the trauma experienced by family, clinicians, and society more broadly occasioned by disputes about medical decision making for patients without capacity.

173

It was clear that Terri Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest, perhaps due to a potassium
imbalance. See Schiavo Timeline, Part 1, U. MIAMI: ETHICS PROGRAMS,
http://www.miami.edu/index.php/ethics/projects/schiavo/schiavo_timline/ (last visited Jan. 7,
20 16). The cause of her cardiac arrest, however, has been disputed. A website set up by the
Schindlers, Terri's parents, characterized her collapse as "a mysterious cardio-respiratory arrest for which no cause has ever been determined." See Terry Schiavo's Story, TERRY
SCHIAVO LIFE & HOPE NETWORK, http://www.lifeandhope.com/terri_schiavo (last visited
Jan. 22, 2016); see also MARK FUHRMAN, SILENT WITNESS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF TERRI
SCHIAVO'S DEATH, 225-26 (2005) (suggesting that Michael Schiavo may have born responsibility for Terri's collapse).
174
Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
175
All of the proceedings in the case are available in a timeline. See Schiavo Timeline,
Part I, supra note 173; see also Schiavo Timeline, Part 2, UNIV. OF MIAMI: ETHICS
PROGRAMS, http://www.miami.edu/index.php/ethics/projects/schiavo/schiavo_timline2/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2016).
176
E. Recine et al., Media Coverage of the Persistent Vegetative State and End-of-Life
Decision-Making, 71 NEUROLOGY 1027 (2008).
177
Because the Schiavo case-though it was entertained in federal and state courtsmade little new law, this section focuses on the story. Relevant legal documents as well as a
time line of the Schiavo story can be found online at Schiavo Timeline, Part I, supra note 173,
and Schiavo Timeline, Part 2, supra note 175.
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In 1990, Terri Schindler Schiavo, then 26 years old and married
since the age of 20 to Michael Schiavo, suffered a cardiac arrest and entered into a persistent vegetative state. 178 She was unable to eat or drink;
a feeding tube provided Terri with nourishment and hydration. 179 Terri
was, however, able to breathe without respiratory support. 180 Michael
Schiavo, as Terri's husband, became her legal guardian and medical decision maker under Florida law. 181 For a few years, Michael cooperated
with Terri's parents in providing care for Terri. 182 Then, in 1993, relationships soured, perhaps as the result of disagreements concerning
money. 183 By the end of the decade, Michael Schiavo sought to have
Terri's life-sustaining care withdrawn. 184 Michael contended that he
wanted to accomplish only what Terri herself would have wanted. 185 The
story, however, was complicated. Even as Michael declined to yield his
role as Terri's guardian and requested withdrawal of life-sustaining care
for Terri, he was cohabiting with another woman, with whom he had two
children. 186
In 2000, Judge Greer for a Florida trial court concluded that Terri's
statements before she became incompetent provided "clear and convincing evidence" that she would choose, in the circumstances in which she
existed at the time of the legal case, to discontinue life-sustaining care. 187
Thus, he sided with Michael, Terri's husband, authorizing the withdrawal of Terri's feeding tube. 188 Terri's parents appealed Judge Greer's decision, but the Florida appellate court affirmed it. 189 Before the case concluded with Terri's death in 2005, the Schiavo-Schindler dispute was
entertained by every level of the Florida court system and by several

178

In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *I (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Prob. Div. Feb. II, 2000).
179 !d.
180
See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. ), review
denied, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001).
181
See Schiavo Timeline, Part I, supra note 173.
182
Schiavo, 2000 WL 34546715, at *2.
183
!d. Michael began a large malpractice action against physicians who had been treating
Terri before her collapse. !d. About a million dollars was awarded between Terri and Michael.

/d.
184

See Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
Schiavo, 2000 WL 34546715, at *6.
186
Wesley J. Smith, The Great Terri Schiavo Divide, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www. fi rstthings.corn!we b-exc I usi ves/2 0 I 5/03/the-great-terri -schiavo-di vide.
187
Schiavo, 2000 WL 34546715, at *6.
188
/d. at *6-7.
189
Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
185
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federal courts, the U.S. Congress, and the nation's President. 190 Beyond
all else, the Schiavo tale and the legal battles that accompanied it suggested the extent of confusion within the law and society about how best
to handle disputes about the withdrawal of life-sustaining care. 191 In
March 2005, five years after Judge Greer found clear and convincing evidence that Terri would not have wanted to be kept alive in the condition
she was in, Terri's feeding tube was removed. 192
4.

The Lessons of Quinlan, Cruzan, and Schiavo

Quinlan made new law 193 and provided a model for states ready to
concede that life-sustaining care, once inserted, could be removed prior
to the patient being declared dead from causes not related to the withdrawal of that care. Cruzan is important because the Supreme Court entertained the case, but the Court's ruling provided little guidance to the
nation about how the law might best handle such cases. Neither Judge
Greer's 2000 decision to order the withdrawal of Terri Schiavo's feeding
tube nor the many judicial proceedings, 194 legislative responses, and ex-

190
See Schiavo Timeline, Part I, supra note 173; see also Schiavo Timeline, Part 2, supra
note 175.
191
See JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 420-30 (3d ed.
2013).
In March, 2005, three days after Terri's feeding tube was removed pursuant to court order,
President George W. Bush signed S. 686, a bill that granted jurisdiction to the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida
[T]o hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of
Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie
Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her
life.
An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. I 09-3, 119 Stat. 15
(2005).
192
The feeding tube had been removed twice previously. Each time a court order led to
the withdrawal of the feeding tube. Schiavo Time line, Part I, supra note 173. On March 31,
2005, almost two weeks after removal of Terri's feeding tube, she passed away. Terry Schiavo's Story, supra note 173.
193
But see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1228-30 (N.J. 1985) (distinguishing Quinlan
from case of patient who could "interact with [her] environment to a limited extent, but whose
mental and physical functioning is severely and permanently impaired and whose life expectancy, even with the treatment, is relatively short" and finding that court was "in error in
Quinlan" in ignoring "evidence of statements that Ms. Quinlan made to friends concerning
artificial prolongation of the lives of others who were terminally ill").
194
See, e.g., Schiavo ex ref. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(denying motion for temporary restraining order); Schindler v. Schiavo, 900 So. 2d 544 (Fla.
2005) (denying all writs jurisdiction); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla.
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ecutive acts that followed re-shape state law. Further, they did not reshape the nation's understanding of how the law might respond effectively and wisely to the issues at stake. The case came to an end only in
2005 when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review 195 the Eleventh
Circuit's decision that facilitated the order to withdraw Terri Schiavo's
care. 196
Although Schiavo did not re-shape Florida laws regarding end-oflife decision making, the case was extraordinarily important in other regards. In particular, it drew public attention to the challenge presented
by a patient-here a young woman-who entered into a persistent vegetative state without having completed an advance directive and without
having engaged in serious, in-depth conversations with family members
about her medical preferences should she need care and lack the capacity
to make her own decisions. The lessons of Terri's case apply equally to
patients suffering from serious medical conditions but incapable of making their own medical decisions.
Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan died before the internet existed.197 Terri Schiavo did not. Terri's story, through blogs, photos, news
stories, and comments, populated the internet for the last several years of
her life and continues to gamer attention. 198 The legal issues in the case,
as stated by a Florida appellate court, could be described simply. The
implications of the issues, however, have been extraordinarily challenging. Judge Altenbemd for a Florida appellate court wrote:
In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was

Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (denying motion for stay). These are only a few of the cases decided
shortly before Terri Schiavo's death.
195
Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
196
Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.), reh 'g denied, 404
F.3d 1282 (lith Cir. 2005).
197
The World Wide Web was available to the public in 1991. Internet History: Timeline,
INTERNET HALL FAME, http://www.intemethalloffame.org/intemet-history/timeline (last visited July 22, 2015).
198
See, e.g., TERRI SCHIAVO LIFE & HOPE NETWORK, http://www.lifeandhope.com/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2016) (website about Terri now maintained by her brother in Pennsylvania);
Sandy Bauers, Schiavo Controversy Returns to Pa., Along with Palin, PHIL. INQUIRER (Apr.
4, 20 13), http://articles.philly.com/20 13-04-04/entertainment/38251788_1_vegetative-patientsarah-palin. A decade after Terri's death, the media still refers to the role of then-Governor of
Florida and presidential hopeful, Jeb Bush in the Schiavo case. See, e.g., Michael Putney,
Opinion, First Round Goes to Bush, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion!op-edlarticle9145133.html (noting that "doctrinaire
liberals" dislike Jeb Bush because of his attempt to have the state intervene in the Schiavo
case on the Schindlers' side).
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whether Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a few weeks in a coma,
but after ten years in a persistent vegetative state ... would choose to continue
the constant nursing care and the supporting tubes in hopes that a miracle
would somehow recreate her missing brain tissue, or whether she would wish
to permit a natural death process to take its course and for her family members
and loved ones to be free to continue their lives. After due consideration, we
conclude that the trial judge had clear and convincing evidence to answer this
199
question as he did.

C. Legislative Responses

In Quinlan, New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Hughes reported that at the time (1976) there was a "relative paucity of legislative
and judicial guides and standards" relating to the matters at issue in the
case. 200 Soon, however-and perhaps in some part because of Justice
Hughes' Quinlan decision-states began widely to promulgate laws pertaining to advance care planning. Generally framed as end-of-life law, a
body of rules and legal options developed within the states. 20 I
Quinlan, Cruzan, and Schiavo, all involving young persons, make it
clear that planning for medical decisions, should one become ill and incapable of making decisions, is not a process that should be reserved only for elderly or sick people. Certainly, old people are more likely to die
than younger people. Young people, however, do die; they may fall into
persistent vegetative states; and they may be seriously ill-but not terminally ill-and in need of surrogate decision making regarding their
care. Advance care planning should be entertained by every adult. 202

199

In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 177, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 200 I).
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (N.J. 1976).
201
The first of these laws was a living-will statute, passed in California in 1976. See Beverly Petersen Jennison, Reflections on the Graying of America: Implications of Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 304 (2015). And
seven years later, California provided by law for a durable power of attorney for health care
decisions. Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK Q. 211, 214-15 (2010), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/IO.llll/j.l4680009.2010.00596.x/pdf. By 1986,41 states had promulgated living will laws. /d. at 214 (citing H.R. Glick, The Right-to-Die: State Policymaking and the Elderly, 5 J. AGING STUDIES
283, 289 (1991 )).
202
Since elderly people as a group are more likely than younger people to face serious
illness and death, advance care planning becomes an even more essential matter for the nation
as its population ages. In 1900, 100,000 people in the U.S. were 85 or older. In 2012, there
were 5.9 million people in that age group. And by 2050, it is expected that 18 million people
will be 85 or older. See HOFFMAN, supra note II, at xv. The extended years of life enjoyed by
the population as a whole are often accompanied by chronic health conditions, including coronary disease, renal disease, lung conditions, and cancer. !d. at xvi.
200
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Federal law requires health care facilities that accept Medicare and
Medicaid patients to inform patients about advance care planning and
about the opportunity to complete advance directives? 03 The details of
the process follow from the laws of the relevant state. By the beginning
of the twenty-first century, every state provided by statute for some form
of advance care planning. 204 Broadly, these laws provide for competent
adults to name a surrogate decision maker and to provide instructions for
medical care should they lose capacity to make medical decisions. 205
These laws, however, do not mandate advance care planning. 206 In general, state laws direct a surrogate to make decisions in harmony with the
principal's pre-incompetency preferences and wishes or, if those are not
clear, in harmony with the principal's best interests. 207 The best-interest
guideline, presumptively objective, 208 offers little concrete assistance.
But it does offer a means for reaching a decision in cases in which there
is inadequate or no evidence about a no-longer-competent patient's preincompetency preferences. 209
203

The Patient Self-Determination Act, passed in 1990, requires hospitals that receive
federal funding (including hospitals that accept Medicare patients) to honor advance directives
and to provide information to patients about advance care planning, including information
about advance directives, when patients enter the facility. Patient Self-Determination Act of
1990 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1990), Pub. L. No. I 01-508 § 4206, I 04 Stat.
1388 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
204
See Norman Cantor, Twenty-five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence
of Death and Dying, 29 J .L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 189 (200 I); Barbara Noah, In Denial: The
Role of Law in Preparing for Death, 21 ELDER L.J. I, 8 & n.21 (2013); see also Rebecca
Kirch, Building a Quality of Life National Movement: Igniting Advocacy to Integrate Palliative Care in Our US Health System, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/20 15/03/30/building-a-quality-of-life-national-movementigniting-advocacy-to-integrate-palliative-care-in-our-us-health-system/.
205
The specifics vary. For instance, some states provide for appointment of a durable
power of attorney. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.300 (West 2014) (providing for
appointment of a durable power of attorney); see also, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
SOCIAL
SERVICES,
ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE
FOR
HEALTH
CARE
FORM,
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph!Director/Documents/advancedirective.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2016). Others provide, for instance, for health proxies, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(h)
(West 2015), or "surrogates," see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.202 (West 2015). By statute,
Florida prescribes a form to appoint a surrogate. /d. § 765.203.
206
Noah, supra note 204, at 9.
207
Cantor, supra note 204, at 189.
208
See, e.g., InreConroy, 486A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (N.J. 1985).
209
The first end-of-life laws provided for people, while competent, to create "living
wills." It was passed in California in 1976. See Jennison, supra note 201, at 304. A second
type of law aimed at providing for end-of-life decision making for people without capacity
appeared about a decade later and followed the model of a power of attorney. Powers of attorney do not survive the principal's incompetency. Thus, states created durable powers of attorney that would authorize surrogates to make decisions for incapable patients. See Sabatino,
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An additional set of state laws identifies default surrogate decision
makers for patients without advance directives. The Uniform HealthCare Decisions Act (UHCDA), presented by the Uniform Law Commission in 1993, delineates default surrogate decision makers in order of
priority for patients who have not identified a surrogate and who lack
capacity. 210 The act lists a patient's spouse as the privileged decision
maker; if the patient does not have a spouse, the act identifies, in this order, an adult child, a parent, and then an adult sibling. 211 If none of these
is available, an adult who cared about the patient and who is familiar
with his or her health care preferences is authorized to serve as a surrogate decision maker. 212 Only six states have adopted the UHCDA. 213
Most states and the District of Columbia, however, now provide for default decision makers, more or less reflecting the order of priority noted
in the UHCDA. 214
Promulgated over several decades, states' end-of-life laws 215 provide a legal frame for the appointment of surrogate decision makers; facilitate identification of decision makers in cases in which a patient had
supra note 201, at 214-15.
By the last decade of the twentieth century, states began also to provide for do-not-resuscitate
orders. /d. at 215. The so-called POLST form (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) was offered first in Oregon in the 1990s, and is now in place or under development in
many other states. /d. at 228-31. Similar options are available outside Oregon under different
names, including West Virginia's POST (Physician Orders for Scope of Treatment) and Vermont's COLST (Clinical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment). !d. at 230, n.l 0. In New
York, the forms are called MOLSTs (medical orders for life-sustaining treatment). See, e.g.,
Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST), N.Y. DEP'T HEALTH,
https://www.health.ny.gov/professionals/patients/patient_rights/molst/ (last visited June 15,
2015). The option to complete a POLST or comparable form does not exist in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota. See POLST: PROGRAM IN YOUR STATE,
http://www .polst.org/programs-in-your-state/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
210
See
Health-Care
Decisions Act Summary,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Health-Care%20Decisions%20Act (last
visited June 24, 20 15).
/d.
212/d.
213
These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico and Wyoming. /d.
214
NAT'L ASSOC. OF CHRONIC DISEASE & CDC HEALTHY AGING PROGRAM, ADVANCE
CARE PLANNING: ENSURING YOUR WISHES ARE KNOWN AND HONORED IF YOU ARE
UNABLE TO SPEAK FOR YOURSELF, 13 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/aging/pdf/advanced-careplanning-critical-issue-brief.pdf. Today, some states add domestic partners to the list. See,
e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2994-d(l)(b) (McKinney 2015). Section 2994-d identifies default surrogate decision makers for adult patients without advance directions.
215
The laws considered here in Part lV.C are referred to as "end-of-life" laws because
they have been promulgated with end-of-life issues in mind. See Lois Shepherd, The End of
End-of-Life Law, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1693, 1695-96 (2014) (noting that these statutes concern
issues regarding end-of-life decision making).
211
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not designated a surrogate while competent; encourage the provision of
pre-incompetency instructions about preferences and wishes regarding
medical care, including end-of-life care; and provide for the refusal of
care, including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation in hospital and nonhospital settings. With such laws, states have attempted to ensure that
advance care plans, if documented pursuant to law, will be followed. 216
This body of law-though important to the facilitation of advance
care planning-has occasioned several concerns. Commentators have
noted the discomfort provoked by the subjunctive at the center of most
advance care planning (e.g., "were I ill and incapable, I would
want ... "). The presumption that the preferences set forth by the oncecapable patient harmonize with what the now-ill, incompetent patient
would want were he or she offered a moment of lucidity for decision
making cannot easily be sustained. 217 That presumption harmonizes
poorly with the notion of autonomous choice-the putative rationale for
the movement to encourage advance care planning. 218 Further, the completion of advance directives does not always preclude disputes among
family members or between surrogates and clinicians. 219 Despite such
concerns, there is a continuing need for advance care planning that includes "the inherent and immediate benefit to the individual of thinking
about and executing an advance directive." 220
Even more, advance care planning has been only partially successful because most adults do not complete advance directives or discuss
their health care preferences with loved ones and clinicians. Discussing
one's own dying and death are discomforting topics for most people and
for their loved ones. In addition, advance care planning has been conflated, mistakenly, with physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia.
D. Physician-assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A "Slippery Slope"
or a Different Matter?
This confusion-between advance care planning and physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia-has burdened efforts to encourage people to contemplate and discuss their medical wishes should they lose the
216

See id. at 1696-97 (delineating the variety of names by which these forms are known
in the states).
217
See, e.g, Steven R. Latham, Living Wills and Alzheimer's Disease, 23 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 425,430--31 (2010).
218
Noah, supra note 204, at 12.
219
See id. at 6-7.
220
!d. at 7-8.
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capacity to make their own medical decisions. 221 Moreover, it has created anxiety among many people about signing advance directives, as a
practical matter. 222 This is unfortunate in that advance care planning is
an important component of good health care. Even more, it can obviate a
patient's interest in physician-assisted suicide or in euthanasia. 223
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court declined to find a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. 224 This left the states free to
choose whether to enact such laws. Oregon, Washington, and Vermont
have legalized physician-assisted suicide. 225 Physician-assisted suicide is
also legal in Montana and New Mexico, as a result of court cases. 226
Claims grounded in ideological interests have clouded the matter. 227
There is no evidence, however, that supports a link between advance
221

Sarah Palin's "death panel" claim is illustrative. See infra Part V.A.I.
See, e.g., Jonathan Moreno, Who's to Choose?: Surrogate Decisionmaking in New
York State, 5 HASTINGS CTR. RPT., no. I, Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 5 (noting concern about slippery
slope should laws provide for withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining care).
223
The confusion was fueled by claims from critics of health care reform that the government would use advance care planning to ration resources for elderly patients. See, e.g.,
Sarah Palin, Concerning the "Death Panels," FACEBOOK (Aug. 12, 2009),
https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=116471698434; see also infra Part V (considering opposition to Medicare's paying clinicians for holding conversations with patients about
advance care planning). These claims were grounded on mistaken or self-consciously twisted
information. See infra Section V.A.I. (considering claims that paying for advance care planning sessions constituted "death panels").
224
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
225
See Death with Dignity Around the U.S., DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT'L CTR.,
http://www.deathwithdignity.org/advocates/national (last updated Oct. 14, 2015). In 1995,
Oregon was the first state to legalize physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the United States.
Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws ch. 3 (West) (codified as amended at OR.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 127.800 et seq. (West 2015)).
226
See Death with Dignity Around the U.S., supra note 225 (noting that about half of the
state legislatures are scheduled to consider the matter in 2015). No state in the U.S. provides
for euthanasia. /d. A number of other countries also legalized physician-assisted suicide, and a
few, including the Netherlands and Belgium, have legalized euthanasia. See, e.g., Termination
of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act of 2002 (Neth.); Euthanasia Act of 2002 (Belg.).
There is still controversy about laws that have legalized physician-assisted suicide and about
their implications for public policy. In the states that have legalized physician-assisted suicide,
however, there is no evidence of abuse. As of February 2015, 1,327 people in Oregon had
filled prescriptions pursuant to the Death with Dignity Act. 859 patients died as a result of
using these prescribed medications. See OR. PUB. HEALTH DIY., OREGON'S DEATH WITH
DIGNITY ACT-2014, (20 14), https://public.health.oregon.gov!ProviderPartnerResources/
EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year 17 .pdf. The practice has been legal
in Oregon for almost 20 years. The Oregon Health Department reports data showing that the
practice is not common there and has not been abused. Since the statute's implementation
most of the patients who relied on it had cancer (68.6% in 2014). Over 2/3 were aged 65 or
older; most (95.2%) were white, and 45.6% had a baccalaureate or higher degree. /d.
227
See infra Part V.
222
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care planning and physician-assisted suicide or between physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia. The matters are distinct. In fact, advance
care planning-by offering patients options for palliative and hospice
care-can further the development of a medical setting that should diminish interest in physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.
A good death, in the contemporary context, should not be confused
with physician-assisted suicide. As John Arras wrote in the same year
that Oregon legalized physician-assisted suicide:
[P]hysicians must learn how to really listen to their patients, to unflinchingly
engage them in sensitive discussions of their needs and the meaning of their
requests for assisted death, to deliver appropriate palliative care, to distinguish
fact from fiction in the ethics and law of pain relief, to diagnose and treat clinical depression, and, finally, to ascertain and respect their patients' wishes for
control regarding the forgoing oflife-sustaining treatment. 228

Such care, now routinely provided by hospice, does not involve the
ingestion of lethal medication. Rather, it depends only on the discontinuance, at a patient's request (or at the request of a patient's surrogate) that
aggressive care be discontinued so that patients "may take advantage of
their next naturally occurring opportunity to die."229 Such requests, however, must be based on the patient's (or his or her surrogate's) understanding of the patient's medical situation and available treatment options. In most cases, that depends on patients having discussed their
health care preferences with loved ones and clinicians before a medical
crisis develops. This is more likely to occur if clinicians are reimbursed
for the time devoted to such conversations. That reimbursement will
make it clear that advance care planning can be an essential component
of good health care.
V.

PAYMENT FOR ADVANCE CARE PLANNING: A NATIONAL DEBATE

The American health care system generally reimburses clinicians
and health care facilities for tests and examinations aimed at diagnosis of
illness (and a few, such as mammography, aimed at early diagnosis), as
well as for a patient's hospitalization and for procedures and medications
228

J.D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 361,388 (1997).
229
Yale Kamisar, Are the Distinctions Drawn in the Debate about End-of-life Decision
Making "Principled"? If Not. How Much Does it Matter?, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 66, 67
(quoting JEANNE FITZPATRICK & EILEEN M. FITZPATRICK, A BETTER WAY TO DIE 41

(2009)).
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provided by health care facilities. Far fewer funds are available to pay
clinicians for attending to patient's most pressing needs near the end of
life than are available for continuing-often essentially uselesstreatments. Dale Lupu has compared services generally considered reimbursable-"procedures, chemotherapy, clinic visits, emergency
room"-with those generally not reimbursed or not reimbursed adequately given the needs of patients near the end of life-"caregiving,
communication and pain control, home visits, and 24-hour on-call nursing."230 Patients would receive better health care were the latter set of
services reimbursable.
Paying clinicians for time spent speaking with patients-as a general matter and with regard to end-of-life care, as a particular matterwould significantly increase patient satisfaction, inform patients about
medical options, and enrich the patient-clinician relationship. In addition
to its most obvious purpose (reimbursement for the time of a skilled professional), availability of payment for such conversations between patients and clinicians would categorize these conversations as a component of good health care (which they are). Yet, just that sort of
suggestion-that Medicare pay clinicians to talk with patients about advance care planning-resulted in charges of governmental "death panels" and fueled unfounded patient concern about the government's role
under the bill that became the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.231
A. Advance Care Planning and Fabricated Claims: Serving
Partisan Political Ends
This Section details the 2009 proposal to pay clinicians for engaging in conversations about advance care planning with patients, and it
details public responses to that proposal. Further it describes a Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") proposed regulation (released in July 2015 and finalized that November) to provide for such
payments beginning in 2016. 232 The matter is basic since willingness to
pay for advance care planning consultations provides compelling evi230

Lupu, supra note 37, at 24.
See Peter Ferrara, How the Obamacare Death Panel Defies the Constitution, AM.
THINKER,
(Jan.
7,
2005),
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/01/how_the_obamacare_death_pane1_defies_t
he constitution.html.
232
Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions
to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70886 (Nov. 16, 2015).
231
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dence of society's commitment to meeting the needs of very sick patients and their families and, more important even, its commitment to a
health care system that assumes that patients and clinicians should converse with each other about the patient's health care.
1. Social Media: Defeating the Coverage Provision
A comment, posted on Facebook in August of 2009 by Sarah Palin
(the 2008 Republican candidate for vice-president), inspired almost onethird of the nation to conclude that the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("PPACA"), if promulgated, would sanction "death panels,"
aimed at limiting care for the elderly. 233 Palin's Facebook comment alleged:
The Democrats promise that a government health care system will reduce
the cost of health care, but as the economist Thomas Sowell has pointed out,
government health care will not reduce the cost; it will simply refuse to pay the
cost. And who will suffer the most when they ration care? The sick, the elderly, and the disabled, of course. The America I know and love is not one in
which my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome will have to stand in front
of Obama' s "death panel" so his bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective
judgment of their "level of productivity in society," whether they are worthy of
health care. Such a system is downright evii. 234

A few days later, again on Facebook, she elaborated on her earlier
post.
Yesterday President Obama responded to my statement that Democratic
health care proposals would lead to rationed care; that the sick, the elderly, and
the disabled would suffer the most under such rationing; and that under such a
system these "unproductive" members of society could face the prospect of
government bureaucrats determining whether they deserve health care. The
President made light of these concerns?35

The "death panel" claim-or myth, as some have referred to it236seems to have been first voiced in public media not by Palin, but, a
233
Brendan Nyhan, Why the 'Death Panel' Myth Wouldn't Die: Misinformation in the
Health
Care
Reform
Debate,
8
FORUM,
no.
I,
2010,
at
10,
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol8/issl/art5 (citing multiple polls).
234
Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7,
2009),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/sarah-palin/statementon-the-current-health-caredebate/1138511 03434.
235
See Palin, supra note 223.
236
Nyhan, supra note 233, at 10.
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month before Palin's Facebook comments, by Elizabeth McCaughey (a
former New York lieutenant government). McCaughey, interviewed in
July 2009 on former Senator Fred Thompson's radio program, opined
about the health reform bill in Congress in 2009. 237
And one of the most shocking things I found in this bill, and there were many,
is on Page 425, where the Congress would make it mandatory-absolutely require-that every five years, people in Medicare have a required counseling
session that will tell them how to end their life sooner, how to decline nutrition, how to decline being hydrated, how to go in to hospice care. And by the
way, the bill expressly says that if you get sick somewhere in that five-year period-if you get a cancer diagnosis, for example-you have to go through that
session again. All to do what's in society's best interest or your family's best
interest and cut your life short. These are such sacred issues of life and death.
Government should have nothing to do with this. 238

McCaughey's central assertions, all false, were broadcast widely
and provided fuel for the claim that the PPACA would have devastating
consequences for Americans' health care. Palin's Facebook post that the
provisions at issue would create "death panels"239 provided additional
fuel for PP ACA opponents. The "death panel" claim, though based on a
serious misreading of the proposed law, resonated with large segments
of the public, in part because it echoed concerns already in the air that
Obama's health reform efforts would result in rationing, especially for
elderly and other vulnerable people. 240
A key claim at the center of the "death panel" claim-the assertion
that counseling for Medicare recipients about advance care planning
would be mandatory every five years or perhaps more often-was fabricated. Yet, according to a July 2010 Kaiser Family poll, a year after both
McCaughey's assertion about mandatory end-of-life counseling sessions
and Palin's death panel claim on Facebook, 36% of seniors believed that
the law241 would permit the government to make decisions about care at
the end oflife for Medicare recipients. 242
237
Fredthompson, Fred Thompson, Betsy McCaughey Interview, YOUTUBE (July 27,
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89hpyOijiGk.
238
See Nyhan, supra note 233, at 8.
239
See Palin, supra note 223.
240
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 4 (July 2010),
http:/lkff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-july-201 0/.
241
By July 2010, the date of the Kaiser Family Foundation poll, the Act had been promulgated. I I 8 Pub. L. No. II-1148, 124 Stat. 119 (20 I 0).
242
KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, supra note 240, at 5. Less than half of those polled
found the claim to have been false. !d.
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In fact, the provision at issue said nothing about rationing and did
not require anyone-neither patients nor clinicians-ever to talk about
advance care planning. It simply provided for paying physicians for time
devoted to conversations with Medicare patients about advance care
planning. 243 More specifically, the provision did not mandate advancecare-planning conversations every five years. Rather, the provision limited payment for such conversations to once every five years, allowing
for payment more often if the patient was diagnosed with a serious illness. In the end, the provision was deleted before Congress promulgated
the PP ACA. The Senate did not include the provision in its bill, 244
passed in December 2009, and renamed it the "Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act" (the name of the act that the President signed in
2010).245
The disparaged provision would only have paid clinicians for conversations about advance care planning, but could well have provided
inspiration for a more general effort to encourage patient-centered care
focused around communication between patients and their primary-care
doctors, and, sometimes, between patients and other clinicians. Communication about advance care planning is not fundamentally distinct from
other patient-clinician conversations about health and health care more
generally. On this, it is instructive to compare language from the 2009
House Bill 3200 with more recent discussions of patient-centered care.
Section 1233 of the House bill described consultations in which
practitioners would explain advance care planning to their patients, describe available "end-of-life services and supports," offer "information
needed for an individual or legal surrogate to make informed decisions"
about advance care planning, and inform a patient about state resources
relevant to effecting the "treatment wishes of that individual" should he

243

America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, II Ith Cong. § 1233
(2009), https://www.compassionandsupport.org/index.php/legislationlhealth_care_reform.
244
S. Amend. 2786 to H.R. 3590, I lith Cong., 155 CONG. REC. 11,607 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 2009).
245
In October 2009, the House replaced H.R. 3200, which contained the advance care
reimbursement provision, with House Bill 3962. See H.R. 3962, I lith Cong. (2009). The bill
that passed in the Senate in December 2009-the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act-was House Bill 3590, which, prior to amendment, was a tax credit proposal for service
members. See John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act, 105 LAW LIBR.
J. 131, 140, 153 (2013). House Bill 3590, as passed, mostly comprised Senate Amendment
2786, which included some content from the previous bills. /d. at 153-58. That bill passed in
the Senate on Dec. 23, 2009. /d. at 158. It did not include a provision to pay physicians for
conversations about advance care planning.
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or she be "unable to communicate those wishes." 246 Patient-centered
care has been similarly described as "revolv[ing] around the patient" in
such a way that "care is generally defined by or in consultation with patients rather than by physician dependent tools or standards."247 In 2001,
the Institute of Medicine defined "patient-centeredness" as "health care
that establishes a partnership among practitioners, patients, and their
families (when appropriate) to ensure that decisions respect patients'
wants, needs, and preferences and that patients have the education and
support they need to make decisions and participate in their own
care."248 And a 2007 report on patient-centered care delineates its key
components to include "involvement of family and friends," "sensitivity
to nonmedical and spiritual dimensions of care," and "respect for patient
needs and preferences. " 249
The negative publicity that followed the death panel claim slanted
the debate and conditioned large segments of the nation to oppose the
proposal to pay clinicians for advance-care-planning conversations with
their patients. Part of the force of anti-PPACA publicity in general and
of that opposing the advance-care-planning payment proposal, in particular, stemmed from the attempt to incorporate these matters into a larger
ideological platform. Thus the debate about advance-care-planning payments was conflated with the longstanding debate about abortion.
2. Death Panels and the Abortion Debate
The death panel claimants assumed, or self-consciously selected, a
set of metaphors that invoked pro-life language in criticizing both Section 1233 of House Bill 3200 and then five years later, in criticizing a
renewed effort-one initiated by the American Medical Association
("AMA")-to have Medicare develop billing codes for discussions between clinicians and patients about advance care planning. 250 In the
246

H.R. 3200 § 1233(a)(l).
James Rickert, Patient-Centered Care: What It Means And How to Get There,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/0I/24/patient-centeredcare-what-it-means-and-how-to-get-there/print!.
248
INST. OF MED., ENVISIONING THE NATIONAL HEALTH CARE QUALITY REPORT 7
(2001).
249
DALE SHALLER, COMMONWEALTH FUND, PATIENT-CENTERED CARE: WHAT DOES IT
TAKE?, at v (2007), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/fundreport/2007/oct!pati ent-centered -care--what-does-it -take/shall er_patientcenteredcarewhatdoesittake_l 067 -pdf. pdf.
250
See Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part 8 for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,686 (proposed July 15, 2015); see also Support
247
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summer of 2009, North Carolina Representative Virginia Foxx (R), described a Republican bill that would have replaced the Democrats'
health care reform bills described as "pro-life because it will not put seniors in a position of being put to death by their government." 251 And in
2014, in response to the AMA proposal, some public voices echoed Palin's 2009 rhetoric. In 2014, Burke Balch, then-director of the Powell
Center for Medical Ethics at the National Right to Life Committee252 explained that the 2014 provision that proposed paying physicians for conversations about advance care planning could result in "subtle efforts to
pressure some of the most vulnerable patients to surrender their right to
life." 253
The similarity to language used in other contexts to describe abortion's consequences for fetuses is readily apparent. 254 Thus, again, rhetoric about end-of-life decision making was shaped in light of claims associated with the pro-life movement. As in the context of earlier cases
about care for vegetative patients (such as Terri Schiavo) in which the

for Medicare Coverage of End of Life Discussions Among Providers, LIFE MATTERS MEDIA
(Sept. 9, 20 14), http://www .lifemattersmedia.org/20 14/09/support-medicare-coverage-end1ife-discussions-among-providers/.
251
Angie Drobnic Holan, PolitiFact's Lie of the Year: 'Death Panels,' POLITIFACT.COM
(Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2009/dec/18/politifact-lieyear-death-panels/.
252
The Powell Center website explains that the Center "serves as NRLC's arm in fighting
to protect the vulnerable born from both direct killing and denial of lifesaving medical treatment, food and fluids." Robert Powell Center for Medical Ethics, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE
COMM., http://www.nrlc.org/medethics/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
253
Michael Ollove, Doctors May Get Paid for End-of life Planning, USA TODAY (June
20 14),
http://www .usatoday.com/story/news/nation/20 14/06/02/stateline-end-of4,
Iife/9867615/.
254
See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, Westmoreland Votes to Protect
Americas Unborn Children (May 18, 2015) (available at http://westmoreland.house.gov/pressreleases/westmoreland-votes-to-protect-americas-unborn-childrenl) (quoting House of Representative Lynn Westmoreland (R.-Ga.) that "Sanctity of Life Act" would offer life to "innocent children, "and that "[t]heir lives are the most vulnerable and we must be the voice for the
voiceless"); National Right to Life Mission Statement, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM.,
http://www.nrlc.org/aboutlmission/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (stating that the National Right
to Life Committee is committed to "protect and defend the most fundamental right of humankind, the right to life of every innocent human being from the beginning of life to natural
death"). The organization's mission statement continues:
National Right to Life carries out its lifesaving mission by promoting respect
for the worth and dignity of every individual human being, born or unborn, including unborn children from their beginning; those newly born; persons with disabilities; older people; and other vulnerable people, especially those who cannot defend
themselves.
!d.
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pro-life movement presumed to equate abortion with end-of-life choices
that limit the continuing use of life-sustaining treatment, 255 those opposing payment for advance-care-planning conversations invoked pro-life
comparisons to undermine statutory and regulatory proposals to have
Medicare pay for such conversations.
3. The Irony of the "Death Panel" Claim and the Implications
of its Success
Perhaps, the most poignant-and most disturbing-aspect of
"Obamacare" opponents' peculiar critique of the legislative effort to pay
clinicians for discussing advance care planning with patients-in effect,
a proposal to pay clinicians to talk with patients about health care matters-is that that payment proposal would have echoed and perhaps even
revivified a very positive and life-giving component of old-fashioned
medicine. 256 The notion of patient-centered care for patients with capacity depends on clinicians and patients talking with each other.
Remarkably, the death panel claimants and their compatriots disparaged an element of health care reform that seems almost expressly
aimed at preserving-or more accurately, re-creating-aspects of the
doctor-patient relationship prized before the widespread "social transformation" of American medicine in the second half of the twentieth
century. 257 Even more, good health care depends on conversations between clinicians and patients. The proposal to pay clinicians for conversations with patients about advance care planning offers a powerful
model for the clinician-patient relationship that assumes communication
255

See supra Part IV.B.3. (detailing Schiavo's legal story about life-sustaining care for a
woman diagnosed to have been in a persistent vegetative state). Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, a pro-life group, organized demonstrations outside the facility in which Terri
Schiavo resided and equated her dying with the death of a fetus. See Smith, supra note 186;
Andrew Seifter, Who is Randall Terry?, MEDIA MATTERS AMERICA (Mar. 21, 2005),
http://mediamatters.org/research/2005/03/21/who-is-randall-terry/132921. Wesley Smith noted that pro-choice groups were joined, in opposing withdrawal of care for Terri Schiavo, by
disability rights groups. See Smith, supra note 186.
256
See Joshua E. Perry, A Missed Opportunity: Health Care Reform, Rhetoric, Ethics and
Economics at the End of Life, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 409,416 (2010) (quoting Dr. J. James Roback, President of the American Medical Association when the "death panel" claim was first
voiced, quoted, and cited in Kevin B. O'Reilly, End-of-Life Care Provision Stirs Angst in
Health Reform Debate, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2009/08/24/prsa0824.htm). Dr. Roback viewed the provision to pay physicians for conversations about advance care planning as "plain, old-fashioned patientcentered care." /d.
257
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
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is a central component of good health care.
B. Revivifying the Coverage Provision

A year before McCaughey and Palin suggested to the nation (with
significant effect) that paying clinicians for consultations with patients
about advance care planning was tantamount to creating "death panels,"
Congress had provided for one Medicare payment to clinicians to address such issues with new Medicare recipients. 258 Efforts to implement
a broader provision-one that would pay clinicians for periodic advance-care-planning conversations with patients- faced strong opposition. Yet, a proposal published by CMS in July 2015 to create two billing codes that cover advance-care planning conversations has been
finalized and extends a welcome beginning. 259 This Part reviews efforts
to provide for Medicare payments for advance-care-planning conversations between 2010 and 2015 in light of the deletion of the provision
from the law that became the PP ACA.
l. Proposals that Failed to Receive Adequate Support

In 2010, the CMS relied on regulatory processes to propose paying
clinicians for advance-care-planning conversations. 260 Supporters of the
regulation worried that publicity, revived from the 2009 fracas about
"death panels," could stymie the new regulatory effort. 261 Indeed, that
happened. In December 2010, a story appeared in the New York Times
describing the proposed Medicare regulation. 262 Other media outlets
soon reported on it. 263 In early January, CMS, expressly bowing to public concern about the regulation, deleted it from the 2011 Physician Fee
Schedule. 264

258

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(ww)(3) (West 2015).
See infra Part V. B.1.
260
Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Part B for CY 2011, 75 Fed.
Reg. 73.170, 73,406, 73,614 (Nov. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405,409-11,
413-15, 424); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L.J. 872, 882 (2013).
261
See Robert Pear, Obama Returns to End-ofLife Plan that Caused Stir, N.Y. TiMES
(Dec. 25, 20 I 0), http://www.nytimes.com/20 I 0112/26/us/politics/26death.html.
262 /d.
259

263
264

See Leonard, supra note 260, at 882-83.

Amendment to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 76 Fed. Reg.
1366, 1366 (Jan. 10, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 410). See Leonard, supra note 260,
at 882-83.
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Two bills, one introduced in the House and one in the Senate in
2013, would have provided payment for consultations regarding advance
care planning. The House bill, "Personalize Your Care Act of 2013,"265
proposed coverage to physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants for voluntary consultations about advance care planning for both
Medicare and Medicaid patients? 66 The bill defined "voluntary advance
care planning consultation" potentially to include (subject to the specification of the Agency's Secretary):
(A) An explanation by the practitioner of advance care planning and the uses
of advance directives. (B) An explanation by the practitioner of the role and responsibilities of a proxy or surrogate. (C) An explanation by the practitioner of
the services and supports available under this title during chronic and serious
illness, including palliative care, home care, long-term care, and hospice care.
(D) An explanation by the practitioner of physician orders for life-sustaining
treatment or similar orders in States where such orders or similar orders exist.
(E) Facilitation by the practitioner of shared decisionmaking with the patient
(or proxy or surrogate) .... 267

The Senate bill, "Care Planning Act of 2015, " 268 provided coverage
for voluntary planning services not more often than once every 12
months (unless the patient's medical situation changed less than 12
months following an advance-care-planning conversation with his or her
clinician). 269 The Senate bill included among its findings the assertion
that the government as the "largest purchaser of health care services" in
the nation must "encourage health care providers to furnish more supportive and comprehensive advanced illness care to improve the efficacy
and quality of health care delivered for generations of Americans to
come."270
In 2014, payment to clinicians for discussions about advance care
planning was again attempted through the regulatory process. 271 At that

265

H.R.II73, 113thCong.(2013).
/d. § 2(a)(I)(B).
267 /d.
268
S. 1549, I 14th Cong. (2015).
269 /d. § 3(a)(2).
270 !d. § 2(9).
271
See Support for Medicare Coverage of End ofLife Discussions Among Providers, LIFE
MATTERS MEDIA (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.lifemattersmedia.org/2014/09/supportmedicare-coverage-end-life-discussions-among-providers/. Two codes were proposed, in fact.
The first (99497) would have provided for payment for discussion about "advance directives
such as standard forms ... by the physician or other qualified health care professional; first 30
minutes, face-to-face with the patient, family members(s), and/or surrogate." The second
266
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time, the American Medical Association ("AMA") submitted billing
codes to CMS that would have paid medical providers for time spent
discussing advance care planning with Medicare patients. 272 The AMA
proposed that Medicare pay for a 30-minute discussion about such planning with Medicare patients. 273 In late 2014, CMS tabled the proposal. 274
The reasons for that action remain unclear275 though CMS claims it
needed more time to garner comments on reimbursements under the two
codes. 276
2. 2015: A New CMS Proposal and a Finalized Rule
In July 2015, CMS again relied on the regulatory process to pro-

pose two codes that would allow clinicians to bill for advance-careplanning conversations. 277 A letter to Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, sent two months earlier and signed by over
60 health care organizations, including the AMA, the American Nurses
Association ("ANS"), and the AARP, urged that Medicare offer the

(99498) would have provided payment for discussion that extended beyond 30 minutes. See
Medicare Declines to Reimburse Physicians for End of Life Discussions in 2015, LIFE
MATTERS MEDIA (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.Iifemattersmedia.org/2014/12/medicaredeclines-reimburse-physicians-end-life-discussions-20 15/.
272
See Support for Medicare Coverage of End of Life Discussions Among Providers, supra note 271.
273 !d.
274 !d.
275
Life Matters Media quotes Thaddeus Pope, a law professor at Hamline University, to
have opined that CMS's response could have reflected "implementation issues or politics." !d.
Pope further suggested that the code might be accepted and implemented by CMS by 2016.
Support for Medicare Coverage of End of Life Discussions Among Providers, supra note 271.
276
Proposed Policy, Payment, and Quality Provisions Changes to the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2016, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July 8,
20 15), https://www .cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/20 15- Fact-sheetsitems/20 15-07 -08.html.
277
The codes, suggested to HHS by the AMA, are numbered 99497 and 99498. Revisions
to Payment Policies under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY
2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,686 (proposed July 15, 2015) [hereinafter CY 2016 CMS Codes].
The CMS proposal describes the codes at issue:
CPT code 99497 (Advance care planning including the explanation and discussion
of advance directives such as standard forms (with completion of such forms, when
performed), by the physician or other qualified health professional; first 30 minutes,
face-to-face with the patient, family member(s) and/or surrogate); and an add-on
CPT code 99498 (Advance care planning including the explanation and discussion
of advance directives such as standard forms (with completion of such forms, when
performed), by the physician or other qualified health professional ... ).
!d. at 41,773.
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codes developed by the AMA. 278 The letter explained:
Published, peer-reviewed research shows that [advance care planning (ACP)]
leads to better care, higher patient and family satisfaction, fewer unwanted
hospitalizations, and lower rates of caregiver distress, depression and lost
productivity. ACP is particularly important for Medicare beneficiaries because
many have multiple chronic illnesses, receive care at home from family and
other caregivers, and their children and other family members are often involved in making medical decisions. 279

CMS proposed that the two codes "should be reported when the described service is reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment
of illness or injury."280 The proposal provided illustrations:
For example, this could occur in conjunction with the management or treatment of a patient's current condition, such as a 68 year old male with heart
failure and diabetes on multiple medications seen by his physician for the
evaluation and management of these two diseases, including adjusting medications as appropriate. In addition to discussing the patient's short-term treatment
options, the patient expresses interest in discussing long-term treatment options
and planning, such as the possibility of a heart transplant if his congestive heart
failure worsens and advance care planning including the patient's desire for
care and treatment if he suffers a health event that adversely affects his decision-making capacity. 281

Thus, the proposal expressly presented the codes as providing coverage for health care thereby making it clear that clinician-patient conversations about the patients' medical situation and proposed care are
part of the practice of good health care. The proposed codes did not cover conversations held "at the beneficiary's discretion, ... under section
1861(hhh)(2)(G) of the Act" 282 (concerning Medicare patients' annual
wellness visit). CMS responded to comments on the proposed codes that
favored providing for reimbursement for advance care planning during a
patient's annual wellness visit. That possibility was added to the codes,
as finalized in November 2015.283 The codes thus cover consultations
278

Letter from AARP et al., to Sec'y Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Dep't of Health & Human
Servs.
(May
12,
2015)
[hereinafter
Letter to
Burwell]
(available at
http://www .aatp.orgldam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/coverage/end-of-life/LT-HHSAdvanceCare-051215.pdf).
279

/d.

280

See CY 2016 CMS Codes, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,773.
281 /d.
282 /d.
283

Final Rule, Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Oth-
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about advance care planning in conjunction with Evaluation and Management services or as an optional component of the annual wellness
visit. 284 Medicare's paying for these conversations will enrich the clinician-patient relationship and, correlatively, promises to improve health
care.
In short, the new codes serve important purposes. Most obviously,
they provide for reimbursing clinicians for time given to an essential part
of health care-talking with patients. Second, the CMS codes explicitly
categorize such conversations, at least in a limited context, as central to
health care. To the extent that that message is more widely internalized
among clinicians and patients, it will more likely be accepted and even
generalized by other payers.
The next Part of this Article describes a number of models for effecting advance care planning. It focuses on one model that is being developed in New York State. This model is unusual in that it depends on
the integrated work of interdisciplinary teams; these teams include lawyers, clinicians, public health professionals, and social science researchers, working with the assistance of university graduate and professional
students.
VI.

ADVANCE CARE PLANNrNG: EDUCATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Broad changes in responses to advance care planning will be furthered as the public becomes increasingly aware of the value of advance
care planning and of the centrality of conversations between patients and
clinicians-as well as conversations between patients and potential surrogates-to advance care planning. This Part presents several approaches developed to educate the public about advance care planning and to
increase the percent of adults who have completed advance directive
forms and engaged in honest conversations about their health care preferences with their clinicians and surrogate(s).
Each of the models described in this Part encourages people to
complete advance care directives and to discuss health care preferences
with potential surrogates and with clinicians-especially primary care
providers. Further, each would seem to further the goals set by the Institute of Medicine's 2014 report on dying in America:
For most people, death results from one or more diseases that must be

er Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70,886, 70,955-99 (Nov. 16, 2015).
284 !d.
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managed carefully over weeks, months, or even years. Ideally, health care
harmonizes with social, psychological, and spiritual support as the end of life
approaches ....
As much as people may want and expect to be in control of decisions about
their own care throughout their lives, numerous factors can work against realizing that desire. Many people nearing the end of life are not physically or
cognitively able to make their own care decisions. It is often difficult to recognize or identify when the end of life is approaching, making clinician-patient
communication and advance care planning so important. ... Understanding
that advance care planning can reduce confusion and guilt among family
members forced to make decisions about care can be sufficient motivation for
ill individuals to make their wishes clear ... .Z85

A. Encouraging Conversations About Advance Care Planning
"Respecting Choices,"286 a program developed in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, in the 1990s has provided a model for other programs. 287 Bud
Hammes, a medical ethicist at the Gundersen Lutheran Health System in
LaCrosse, created Respecting Choices in response to a set of conundrums facing the loved ones and health care providers of very ill patients
without capacity to make medical decisions for themselves. 288 Clinicians
in LaCrosse found that patients' family members were often ignorant of
their loved ones' pre-incapacity health care preferences? 89 That made
medical decision making extraordinarily burdensome for patients' health
care agents. 290 In response, a cadre of clinicians, attorneys, clergy, and
others working in LaCrosse joined together in order to educate the
community about medical choices, especially in end-of-life situations. 291
Respecting Choices has been remarkably successful. In LaCrosse,
by 2009, over 95% of adults had completed advance directives. 292 That
compares with about 25 to 30% of adults in the nation. 293 The success in
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DYING IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at S-1-S-2.
Respecting Choices Advance Care Planning, GUNDERSEN HEALTH SYS.,
http://www.gundersenhealth.org/respecting-choices (last visited Jan. 26, 20 16).
287
Craig Hatkoff et al., How to Die in America: Welcome to LaCrosse, Wisconsin,
FORBES (Sept. 23, 20 14), http://www. forbes.com/sites/offwhitepapers/20 14/09/23/how-to-diein-america-welcome-to-la-crosse/.
288 /d.
289
Joseph Shapiro, Why This Wisconsin City Is the Best Place to Die, NPR (Nov. 16,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 120346411.
290 !d.
291 /d.
292
See Hatkoff et al., supra note 287.
293
/d.; see also DYING IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 3-7 (noting that fewer than 30% of
adults have had conversations about end-of-life care).
286
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LaCrosse has not resulted in health care professionals rationing care to
the elderly and dying people. 294 Moreover, in LaCrosse, the average
lifespan is about a year longer than the national average lifespan. 295 Yet,
patients in LaCrosse spend less time in the hospital near the end of life
than do patients in other places, and the cost of hospitalization for LaCrosse's elderly population is "unusually low." 296
Atul Gawande reports that the intensive care unit ("ICU") at the
Gundersen Lutheran Hospital in LaCrosse seems to resemble many others in the nation-until one looks more carefully. 297 When Gawande visited the Gundersen ICU, all of the patients were terribly ill, but none had
a terminal condition. 298 ICU patients in LaCrosse are far more likely to
recover than to linger. The transformation in LaCrosse has depended almost entirely on a focused and committed effort to educate community
members (not just old, sick people, but everyone) about advance care
planning and, in that way, to encourage everyone to engage in conversations about advance care planning. 299 In LaCrosse, "[e]veryone talks
about it. " 300
Since Respecting Choices was created, similar programs have been
developed elsewhere. 301 The Conversation Project302 suggests that implementing care without talking with a patient about his or her "care
wishes" or delivering care not in harmony with a patient's expressed
wishes is "on a par with medical errors."303 The Conversation Project offers a "Starter Kit," available online, to help people engage in conversa.
twns
about advance care p 1anmng. 304
0

294

See Shapiro, supra note 289.

295

ATUL GA WANDE, BEING MORTAL: MEDICINE AND WHAT MATIERS IN THE END 178

(2014).
296
297

/d.

298
299

!d.

/d. at 178-89.

GA WANDE, supra note 295, at 179.
See Hatkoff et al., supra note 287.
301
See Respecting Choices Advance Care Planning, supra note 286.
302
See About Us, CONVERSATION PROJECT, http://theconversationproject.org/about/ (last
300

visited Jan. 27, 2016). The Project was created by journalist Ellen Goodman and others. Beginning in 2011, the Conversation Project has worked in partnership with the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement ("IHI"). IHI is a non-profit committed to improving health and
health care in the US and elsewhere. /d.
303
KELLY MCCUTCHEON ADAMS ET AL., INST. FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT,
"CONVERSATION READY": A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING END-OF-LIFE CARE 12-13
(2015),
http://www.henryford.com/documents/Advance%20Care%20Pianning/IHIConversationReady
WhitePaper.pdf.
304
Your Conversation Starter Kit, CONVERSATION PROJECT & INST. HEALTHCARE
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The Project's website offers some straightforward statistics that
make the need for conversations about advance care planning transparent.305 For instance, although the great majority of people (90%) assert
that talking to loved ones about advance care planning is important, only
about a quarter have actually engaged in such a conversation? 06 Similarly, most people (82%) say that it is important to put in writing their endof-life preferences, but very few have spoken to a clinician about it
(7%). 307 A number of other projects further this work in various parts of
the country. 308

B. The CHAT Project
This Section focuses on a recent addition to the models created
throughout the country in the wake of the success of Respecting Choices
in LaCrosse, Wisconsin. Conversations: Health And Treatment
("CHAT"), 309 developed by an interdisciplinary team of attorneys, clini-

IMPROVEMENT,
http://theconversationproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/20 15/05ffCP_StarterKit_20 15_Final_Writeable.pdf (last visited Jan. II,
2015). The Starter Kit is offered without charge.
305 /d.
306

See id.
See id.
308
See,
307

e.g.,
Empath
Choices
for
Care,
EMPATH
HEALTH,
https://www.empathchoicesforcare.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2016); EPEC PROJECT,
EDUCATION FOR PHYSICIANS ON END-OF-LIFE CARE (EPEC) PARTICIPANT'S HANDBOOK
( 1999), http://www.ama-assn.org/ethic/epecldownloadlmodule_l.pdf. The Institute for Ethics
at the American Medical Association created the EPEC project. /d.
Dr. Patricia Bomba has spearheaded a focus on end-of-life planning in New York State. She
now leads a program ("Compassion and Support at the End of Life"). "The Community-Wide
End of Life/Palliative Care Initiative" was originally co-led by Excellus BlueCross BlueShield
and the Rochester Health Commission. About Us, COMPASSION & SUPPORT,
https://www.compassionandsupport.org/index.php/about_us/leadership (last visited Jan. 27,
2016). The Initiative encourages health care communities to have advance directive forms,
accepted by all health care institutions and clinicians providing care within the community.
About
Us:
Core
Principles
and
Goals,
COMPASSION
&
SUPPORT,
https://www.compassionandsupport.org/index.php/about_us/core_principles_goals (last visited Jan. 27, 2016). Further, Dr. Bomba played a crucial role in bringing the MOLST form
("Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment") to New York State. MOLSTs are physician
orders that allow patients to provide for the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Within nursing
homes and hospitals, MOLSTs can provide for any physician order about life-sustaining care.
Outside of hospitals, they provide for Do Not Resuscitate ("DNR") and Do Not Intubate
("DNI") orders. Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST), N.Y STATE DEP'T
HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/professionals/patients/patient_rights/molst/ (last visited
Jan. 27, 2016).
309
The CHAT project has been developed by the Gitenstein Institute for Health Law &
Policy at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and the Northwell Health
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cians, public health professionals, social science researchers, and university students, was developed as the result of a partnership between the
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and the Northwell Health, both in Nassau County, N.Y. 310 CHAT is unusual among
programs encouraging advance care planning in that it relies on the resources of several university professional schools and departments as
well as on the resources of a major health care system. The program,
now operating in a few counties in southern New York State, 311 strives
to educate communal, professional, academic, governmental, and patient
groups about advance care planning; to encourage "chats" about advance
care planning; to offer one-on-one assistance to people ready to complete New York State's advance-care-planning forms; to encourage people to reexamine and, if appropriate, re-draft advance-care-planning
documents over time; and to identify and remedy gaps in state laws that
pertain to advance care planning. 312 CHAT responds to the concerns of a
heterogeneous population. 313 Reviewing a few of CHAT's legal, clinical,
and communal foci provides a broad overview of the effort to make advance care planning a routine and comfortable process in a community
with many ethnic, religious, and language groups and a steep socioeconomic hierarchy. 314
(previously known as the North Shore-LIJ Health System). As Director of the Gitenstein Institute, I have worked with CHAT from its start and have participated in or closely observed the
creation of the program's various parameters, as outlined in this Section. More attention is
paid to CHAT in this Part of the Article than to other programs offering similar services because CHAT is the program with which I am most familiar. Although the various programs
encouraging advance care planning differ in services provided and in their approaches, all aim
to effect similar goals. See Our Mission, CHAT, http://www.thechatproject.org (last visited
Jan. 27, 2016).
310
See id.
311
CHAT participants are now working in geographic areas surrounding Hofstra University and the North Shore-LIJ Health System.
312
Kenneth J. Selvester, Hofstra Law's Gitenstein Institute Launches CHAT Project to
Help With Advance Care Planning, HOFSTRA L.: LAW NEWS (July 30, 2015),
http ://lawnews. hofstra.edu/20 I 5/07/30/hofstra-la ws-gi tenstein-i nstitute-launches-chat-projectto-help-with-advance-care-planning/.
313
The county's population in 2014 was about 1,358,000. In 2013, the population included African Americans (12.6%), American Indians or Alaska Natives (0.5%), Asian (9.1%),
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Island (0.1 %), Two or More Races (I. 7%), Hispanic or
Latino (16.1 %), and White (62.3%). Over one-fifth of the population was foreign born (19902013). The median household income (2009-2013) was high-$97,690. Yet, 6% of the population lived below the federal poverty level. State and County Quick Facts, Nassau County,
New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36059.htrnl (last
visited July 6, 2015).
314
This Section focuses on the development and parameters of the CHAT project. It also,
however, refers to other programs, some of which have provided models for CHAT, and it
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I. The Law and Advance Care Planning
CHAT's work reflects the multi-dimensional parameters of advance
care planning. CHAT participants engage in education, advocacy, individual consultations, and research. 315 The legal arm of CHAT offers education about advance-care-planning laws, conducts research aimed at
identifying laws most likely to serve the needs of patients, their loved
ones and their clinicians, and advocates for change once gaps in the law
have been identified. Law students, supervised by attorneys, offer oneon-one consultations with anyone desirous of such guidance. New York
state laws govern these consultations.
A brief review, noting highlights only ofNew York's advance-careplanning laws, suggests the broad outlines of most states' responses to
medical decision making for patients without capacity. (Details vary
from state to state.) New York is unusual among the states in requiring
physicians to "offer" to provide terminally ill patients with "information
and counseling regarding palliative care and end-of-life options appropriate to the patient."316
In 1990, New York passed the Health Care Proxy Act. 317 That law
authorizes a competent adule 18 to appoint a health care agent through
completion of a health care proxy form and to delineate "wishes or instructions about health care decisions."319 A remarkable percentage
refers to broader research results that have offered valuable data in shaping CHAT.
315
These services are offered through the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra
University as part of a clinic and a special problems seminar. The services are offered without
cost.
316
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2997-c (McKinney 2015). California has a similar right-toknow law. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 442.5 (West 2015). See also Katherine B. Ledden, Comment, A Nudge in the Right Direction with a Stick the Size of CMS: PhysicianPatient Communication at the End of Life, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 389,412-17
(2013) (considering New York and California "right to know" laws).
317
CHAT operates in New York. Thus, New York advance-care-planning laws are central to CHAT's work.
318
The provision presumes all adults to be competent for this purpose unless they have
been "adjudged incompetent or otherwise adjudged not competent to appoint a health care
agent" or have been subject to the appointment of a committee or guardian of the person pursuant to Article 78 of the state's mental hygiene law or Article 17-A of the surrogate's court
procedure act. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2981(1 ).
319
State law directs that the form be signed, dated, and witnessed by two adults who also
must sign the document. Notarization is not necessary. !d. § 2981 (2). The statute further provides:
(a) The health care proxy shall: (i) identify the principal and agent; and (ii) indicate
that the principal intends the agent to have authority to make health care decisions
on the principal's behalf, (b) The health care proxy may include the principal's
wishes or instructions about health care decisions, and limitations upon the agent's
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(86%, by one estimate) of medical decisions about the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining care is made by surrogates, not by the patient.320 The burden on surrogates can be terrible. Studies have correlated
the "surrogate experience" with "the surrogate's level of confidence in
his or her knowledge of which treatment the patient would have wanted."321 Among significant stressors that make the surrogate's role more
difficult, several-such as "uncertainty of patient's preferences" and
"conflict with clinicians and farnily" 322-can be mitigated by advance
care planning that includes honest conversations with potential surrogates and with the patient's clinicians. 323 All CHAT participants direct
anyone ready to complete advance directive forms to examirie and understand the forms and then wait to complete them until one has engaged
in conversations with one's potential surrogates and one's clinicians.
So-called living wills are not expressly provided for by New York's
law, but they can be drafted as supplements to instructions for one's
agent that are provided on the proxy form or in lieu of express instructions on the form itself. 324 Many New York lawyers advise their use. 325

authority, (c) The health care proxy may provide that it expires upon a specified
date or upon the occurrence of a certain condition. If no such date or condition is
set forth in the proxy, the proxy shall remain in effect until revoked. If, prior to the
expiration of a proxy, the authority of the agent has commenced, the proxy shall not
expire while the principal lacks capacity.
/d.§ 2981(5). Section 2981(5)(d) offers a model proxy form but does not require use of the
model for implementation of an effective proxy. The law further allows for appointment of an
"alternative agent." !d. § 2981 (6). The state's model proxy form and instructions related to
completing it can be found at http://www.health.ny.gov/forms/doh-1430.pdf.
320
See Michael H. Limerick, The Process Used by Surrogate Decision Makers to Withhold and Withdraw Life-Sustaining Measures in an Intensive Care Environment, 34
ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 331, 331 (2007) (citing V. Swigart et al., Letting Go: Family Willingness to Forgo Life Support, 25 HEART AND LUNG: J. CRITICAL CARE 483 (1996}).
321
David Wendler & Annette Rid, Systematic Review: The Effect on Surrogates of Making Treatment Decisions for Others, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336, 343 (2011) (reviewing 40 articles that analyzed burdens placed on surrogate decision makers).
322
/d. at 344.
323
Those decisions are to be made in concert with the principal's pre-incompetency wishes or, if those are not known, in concern with the principal's best interests. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2982(2). A principal's pre-incompetency preference about the withdrawal of assisted nutrition and hydration can be stated on the face of the proxy form or in a living will. One can provide simply that one's agent is aware of one's wishes regarding artificial nutrition and hydration. However, the agent is not authorized to order the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration unless it is known that the principal, while competent, would have wanted that to
happen./d.
324
See C. Raymond Radigan & Jennifer F. Hillman, Interplay of Health Care Proxy and
Living Will, N.Y. L.J. (July 14, 2014).
325
See id.
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Living wills are sometimes preferred to including relevant instructions
on the proxy form because a living will can be re-drafted over time
without the need to complete a new, witnessed proxy form. Living wills,
however, if not composed with care, can limit an agent's discretion by
providing the agent with instructions that, in the nature of the case, were
not composed in light of the patient's actual medical situation at the time
that medical decision making becomes necessary or of medical options
when health care decisions are actually needed. 326 On the whole, health
care agents, and the patients for whom they make decisions, will be better served by having engaged in conversations about the principal's
health care preferences and choices than by a detailed written document
that may stymie the agent's decision-making authority in a manner that
the principal, if capable, would not want. 327 Attorneys, clinicians, or others helping patients complete proxy forms, should be aware of and able
to recommend some of the programs that guide people through such
conversations comfortably. 328
Those counseling clients about advance care planning in New York
should address some limits of the law with clients. First, anyone who has
completed a proxy form should be urged to re-examine it over time. An
individual's preferences may change as his or her health status changes,
and the principal may want to re-consider the agent named on the form.
An agent may die or move away or simply lose contact with the principal. Further, a proxy form is of little use if it cannot be located when
needed. At a minimum, copies of the form should be given to the proxy,
any alternate proxy, and the principal's primary care clinician.
Should a person fail to complete a health proxy form in New York
and thus not name a proxy decision maker, a surrogate decision maker is

!d.
/d. Engaging in such conversations further ensures that the agent identified on a proxy
form will not learn of his or her appointment only after the principle has lost capacity and is in
need of medical decision making. New York law does not require the agent to sign or even
read the principal's health care proxy fonn. This can obviously lead to confusion and significant discomfort for the agent if he or she is unaware of the appointment before his or her services are needed.
328
See. e.g., Compassion and Support at the End of Life, EXCELLUS,
http://www.CompassionAndSupport.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2016); Welcome to the Conversation Project Starter Kit, CONVERSATION PROJECT, http://theconversationproject.org/starterkit/intro/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2016); Jim Kiney, The Planetree Patient Preference Passport:
An Innovative Tool to Drive Patient and Family Engagement, PLANETREE,
http://planetree.org/planetalklthe-planetree-patient-preferences-passport/ (last visited Jan. 27,
2016).
326
327
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identified pursuant to the Family Health Care Decisions Act. 329 This law
has been important to health care facilities and family members, but the
act's prescriptions may not reflect the pre-incompetency preferences of a
particular patient. The surrogate decision maker chosen pursuant to the
priority assigned by the law may not be someone whom the principal
would have wanted to make important decisions for him or her. 330
Moreover, a patient without a completed health care proxy form is probably less likely than those with advance directives to have engaged in
open and honest conversation with potential surrogates about his or her
preferences.
CHAT's advocacy arm has identified several gaps in federal and
state law. First, all insurers should pay clinicians for time devoted to
conversations with patients about advance care planning. 331 Further, advance-care-planning laws should require primary care clinicians to offer
to discuss advance care planning with each patient whenever that patient
has a change in his or her health situation or a change that suggests a
need to identify a new surrogate, as well as periodically (e.g., every five
years). Moreover, in order to ensure the availability of a person's advance-care-planning document when it is needed, clinicians should use
electronic health records that facilitate inclusion of these documents. The
generalization of these improvements depends on legislative activity and
education for clinicians about the significance of advance care planning.
Each of these developments can best be accomplished through interdisciplinary teams, such as those developed within CHAT. Such teams allow attorneys to share their expertise about state law with clinicians,
public health professionals, social workers, clergy, and others.332

329

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2994-a et seq. (McKinney 2015).
In order of priority, New York law identifies as the decision maker for a patient without capacity, who did not complete an advance directive: 1. a guardian appointed pursuant to
the mental hygiene law, a spouse, if not legally separated rrom the patient, or the patient's
domestic partner; 3. an adult child; 4. a parent; 5. an adult sibling; 6. a close rriend. /d.
§ 2994-d.
331
See supra Part V. The CY 2016 Medicare reimbursement rule makes a start, but state
and federal lawmakers should go further and require insurers to provide coverage for optional
advance care planning in the event of a change in health status as well as periodically.
332
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that CHAT provides
opportunities for students in a variety of professional programs, working on interdisciplinary
teams, to benefit by sharing experiences and knowledge with students and professionals in
other disciplines.
330
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Clinicians and Advance Care Planning

CHAT's clinical participants work within a health care system
committed to helping patients and patients' surrogates understand medical options and advance care planning and to programs that guide clinicians in how best to do this. 333 The Institute for Healthcare Improvement
("IHI") delineates five "core principles" that can direct health care institutions to guide patients through conversations about end-of-life care;
safeguard information discerned during those conversations; and then
respect patients' preferences "at the appropriate time." 334
IHI's core principles harmonize with CHAT's goals. The first principle recognizes the importance of guiding patients and their families
(hopefully long before the end of life) to consider "what matters most to
them about care at the end of life."335 IHI's second core principalserving as a steward for information about patients' preferences-is described to be as fundamental as "knowing, confirming, and documenting
[a patient's] allergies." 336 The third principle focuses on the significance
of constructing "a patient centered plan of care" and on a commitment to
implementing that plan (or a transformation of it if patient preferences
change over time). 337 The fourth IHI principle advises clinicians to complement their guidance to patients in advance care planning by themselves engaging in advance care planning. 338
This raises some interesting questions about clinicians own preferences for end-of-life care. Those preferences, at least in the abstract, do
not seem to differ dramatically from those of the nation's majority. Physicians, unlike many non-physicians, however, almost all actually do refuse aggressive care when diagnosed with a terminal illness. 339
In 2011, Ken Murray, a California family practice physician, authored a short piece entitled How Doctors Die 340 that went viral quickly.341 Doctors, Murray noted, have access to health care and know the

333

See supra note 309-310 and accompanying text (listing CHAT partners).
!d. at 4.
!d. at 12.
336 !d.
337
MCCUTCHEON ADAMS ET AL., supra note 303, at 13.
338 !d.
339
Stephanie O'Neill, 'A Terrible Way to End Someone 's Life,' KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(July 6, 20 15), http://khn.org/news/a-terrible-way-to-end-someones-life/. The story was developed by Southern California Public Radio, NPR, and Kaiser Health News. !d.
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Murray, supra note 53.
341
O'Neill, supra note 339.
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medical options. They do not "want to die; they want to live."342 Yet,
they do not die "like the rest of us. " 343
Murray writes:
[T]hey know enough about death to know what all people fear most: dying in
pain, and dying alone. They've talked about this with their families. They want
to be sure, when the time comes, that no heroic measures will happen-that
they will never experience, during their last moments on earth someone breaking their ribs in an attempt to resuscitate them with CPR (that's what happens
344
if CPR is done right).

Murray's commentary strongly supports training clinicians that it is
acceptable to treat patients as they, themselves, would want to be treated.345
Finally, the fifth IHI principle recommends attention to culturally
sensitive connections with patients:
Providers can fall short of their aim of providing patient-centered end-of-life
care if they do not account for cultural influences-religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, educational, and geographic-that impact how a patient approaches
end-of-life care. This area of work is vital for becoming Conversation
346
Ready.

These concerns suggest the need to develop training programs in
advance care planning for staff at health care facilities. 347 The Institute
of Medicine report titled Dying in America reports that too often physi-

342

Murray, supra note 53.
/d.
344 Id.
345
Responses to Ken Murray's blog, though largely laudatory, included a few sharp
comments from critics. One person, identifying himself as an ICU physician, commenting on
Murray's blog piece, took umbrage. Identified as Edward Omron, this blog commenter asserted that Murray had "maligned and insulted the field of critical care medicine" and "confuse[d]
our excellent ICU care with the ethical questions of informed medical decision making, advance directives, patient autonomy, and rationing of health care resources." Edward Omron,
Comment to How Doctors Die: It's Not Like the Rest of Us, But it Should Be, ZOCALO PUB.
SQUARE: NEXUS (2013), http://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2011/ll/30/how-doctorsdie/ideas/nexus/. In July 2015, the comment is reported to have been offered "2 years ago." /d.
Edward Omron seems to have misinterpreted Murray's intention. In particular, Murray does
not seem to have been suggesting that ICUs close up shop but rather, that patients with terminal conditions not be encouraged to receive aggressive end-of-life treatment.
346
MCCUTCHEON ADAMS ET AL., supra note 303, at 13.
347
Id. at 14. A 4-hour training program developed by the IHI focuses on these matter. For
further discussion of POLST forms, see supra note 209 and accompanying text. In New York
State MOLST forms serve as the equivalent to POLST forms. See id.
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cians provide inadequate end-of-life care, "fail[ing] to have compassionate and caring communication with patients and family members about
what to expect and how to respond as disease progresses." 348 The consequences are unfortunate for everyone. "If end-of-life discussions were an
experimental drug," suggests Atul Gawande, "the FDA would approve
it."349

3. The Community, Advance Care Planning, and Public
Health
Public health professionals and social science researchers working
within CHAT 350 use their training in epidemiology, biostatistics, and research methodology to assess the project's successes and limitations
(gaged, for instance, by patient satisfaction with advance care planning
sessions and by surrogate and clinician satisfaction with medical care for
incapable patients as well as by rates of hospice care utilization). Further, their training in public health administration equips them to manage
a growing interdisciplinary project based at several locations and geared
toward serving a large, heterogeneous population.
A focus on population health-one that complements a focus on individual health-is a crucial parameter of almost any community-wide
project aimed at improving health care and health care experiences for
patients and clinicians. The community in which CHAT operates is
characterized by a broad socio-economic spectrum, many language
groups, a variety of religions-some of which have clear positions about
end-of-life care-and many racial and ethnic sub-communities. Framing
responses that meet the particular needs of diverse communities within
the larger community is a crucial component of the project's work.

C. Implications for the Cost of Good Health Care?
Accusations such as Palin's "death panel" claim in 2009351 -based
on the presumption that advance care planning serves to ration care for

348

DYING IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at 16 (citation omitted).
GAWANDE, supra note 295, at 178.
350
Much of this work has been undertaken by students in Hofstra's Master of Public
Health program. In this work, they are supervised and directed by University professors in
public health and law and by clinicians and researchers at Northwell Health (previously
known as the Northshore-LIJ Health System). See supra note 309-310 and accompanying text
(describing composition of CHAT program's representatives).
351
See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
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the sake of cost savings-are bogus. Some commentators have argued
that effective advance care planning is likely to encourage people near
the end of life to consider palliative care and hospice care sooner than
they otherwise might. 352 Even if that is so-and advance care planning
aims to further patients' preferences, not to stymie them-it is a mistake
blithely to assume that palliative and hospice care decrease end-of-life
costs. But quite as important, hospice care at the end of life does sometimes lengthen patients' lifespans. 353
There is still no unanimity of opinion among researchers or policy
advocates about the consequences of advance care planning for the nation's health care costs. In LaCrosse, advance-care-planning conversations between clinicians and patients are routine and expensive. 354 Hospitals in LaCrosse, however, also spend far less in the last two years of
patients' lives than does any other place in the nation. 355
The Institute ofMedicine's 2014 report on dying in the U.S. notes
that "[i]n the absence of adequate documented advance care planning,
the default decision is to treat a disease or condition, no matter how
hopeless or painful."356 The report then suggests that "[b]ecause most
people who participate in effective advance care planning choose maximizing independence and quality of life over living longer, advance
care planning can potentially save health care costs associated with unnecessary and unwanted interventions. " 357
It may be that advance care planning will result in lower health care
costs. Some researchers, however, have suggested that it may increase
costs. One study of fee- for-service Medicare recipients residing in nurs-

352
See Amoi K. Narang eta!., Trends in Advance Care Planning in Patients with Cancer:
Results from a National Longitudinal Survey, I JAMA ONCOLOGY 601, 602-07 (20 15) (finding completion of durable powers of attorney did not necessarily correlate with end-of-life
decisions about care, in large part because of the absence of serious conversations between
patients and clinicians and surrogates and clinicians; in short, the default position, absent informative discussions, is to treat aggressively).
353
Charles F. VonGunten eta!., Why Oncologists Should Refer Patients Earlier for Hospice Care, CANCER NETWORK (Nov. 30, 2011 ), http://www.cancemetwork.com/end-lifecare/why-oncologists-should-refer-patients-earlier-hospice-care ("[H]ospice care does not
shorten life expectancy. For certain diagnoses, hospice enrollment is actually associated with
longer survival times.").
354
See Shapiro, supra note 289 (reporting that advance care planning conversations cost
the hospital system "millions of dollars a year").
355
/d. Shapiro reports that according to the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, the average
cost for care during the last two years of life at the Gundersen Healthcare Network in LaCrosse is approximately $18,090. In the nation, the average is approximately $26,000./d.
356
DYING IN AMERICA, supra note 44, at S-9.
357 /d.
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ing homes in 2004 and 2009 found an increase in costs among those in
hospice care at the end of life. 358 Nursing home decedents not electing
hospice in 2009 saw a mean increase in expenditures of$3,143, as compared with a $9,906 increase among those electing hospice in 2009 (defming increases "relative to their matched 2004 non-hospice users, for a
net adjusted increase of $6,761"). 359 Some part of the increase might
have been a consequence of Medicare's payment design. 360
The landscape of hospice providers in the United States had changed, from
small not-for-profit providers to increasingly for-profit hospice chains. The
percent of persons receiving hospice care in a nursing home tripled from 14%
of Medicare decedents in 1999 to nearly 40% in 2009. Medicare pays a perdiem rate for routine hospice care, regardless of whether services are provided,
which raises the policy concern that profit motives may be driving selective
enrollment of nursing home residents without cancer, who have longer hospice
lengths of stay. 361

Whether or not hospice participation increases costs, there is powerful "evidence that hospice improves the quality of care."362 Similarly,
whether advance care planning proves ultimately to decrease or to increase the nation's health care budget, it improves health care and serves
clinicians, patients, and patients' loved ones.
VII.

CONCLUSION

By the early nineteenth century, modernity had ushered in an age
that was displacing religions' role in defining and monitoring society's
most fundamental values and beliefs with secular truths, often identified
by science, analyzed by philosophy and its cousin disciplines among the
humanities, and regulated by a civil polity increasingly committed to autonomous individuality and dependent on the presumption of consensus
rule making. Those changes reset the social axis in terms of which people understood themselves and their world. The consequences were
revolutionary.
Almost inevitably new visions of death emerged-or more accurately, new options for dying largely encompassed visions of death.
358
Pedro Gozalo et al., Changes in Medicare Costs with the Growth of Hospice Care in
Nursing Homes, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1823, 1823 (May 7, 2015).
359
!d. at 1828.
360
/d. at 1830.
361
/d. at 1829 (footnotes omitted).
362
Goza1o et al., supra note 358, at 1830.
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These changes were evident even before technological developments facilitated understandings of dying as a process that could ward off death
for long periods. 363 Almost no one expressly refuted the inevitability of
death-at least not until recently. 364 But beginning in the middle decades
of the twentieth century, advances in medicine and technology made it
possible to hold death at bay with life-sustaining treatments for months
or even years. 365
Over time it became clear to many, including the clinicians and
loved ones of dying patients that far less was being gained than had once
been imagined by the prolongation of the dying process. Yet, requests to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining care were met with resistance in
cases in which those requests were made by surrogates for terminal and
permanently vegetative patients without capacity. State legislatures responded by providing for advance directives that facilitated the appointment of a surrogate and provided for the delineation of medical
preferences by capable adults contemplating the need for medical decisions complicated by the loss of capacity. 366
Yet, legal provision for advance care planning has not adequately
encouraged people to engage in the process. Almost all (about 90%) of
Americans say they hope to die at home. 367 Yet, only about one-third of
Medicare recipients (65 and older) do die at home. 368 Many people never
complete advance directives. 369 Furthermore, successful advance care
planning-planning that serves the once-competent patient as well as his
or her surrogates and clinicians-depends both on completion of ad-
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See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
Betsy lssacson, Silicon Valley is Trying to Make Humans Immortal-and Finding
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historical precedents for claims of immortality and describing twenty-first century work aimed
at stunning increases in lifespan and health-span). lssacson reports that the Russian Dmitry
Itskov aims to be alive at 10,000, and Sergey Brin, who co-founded Google, wants to "cure
death." /d.
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See supra Part Ill. B.
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vance directives and on honest conversations-sometimes more than a
few conversations370-with potential surrogates and clinicians.
Changes in federal and state law can facilitate this. Insurers, including government insurers, should cover periodic and episodic advancecare-planning conversations between clinicians and patients for all
adults. 371 Additionally, state laws should require clinicians to offer to
engage in conversations with patients about advance care planning. The
conversations should not be mandatory, but clinicians should be encouraged to suggest to patients the usefulness of such conversations at least
once every five years (and more frequently if a patient's health status
changes). Further, all adults should be encouraged (by lawyers, clinicians, and public health experts) to engage in serious conversations
about medical preferences with potential surrogates and with their primary care clinician as well as others involved in their health care. Excellent models for beginning and carrying out these conversations are available.372
Dying should not be prolonged simply because it can be. This is
ever the more compelling for patients who may be in pain, even though
not capable of entertaining their own medical decisions. Patients who,
while capable, would have chosen to discontinue life-sustaining care
should have that choice made for them after they lose capacity to make it
for themselves. And surrogates and clinicians, working together, should
have the solace of knowing, and the authority to act in accord with, the
pre-incompetency medical wishes of the patients for whom they are
making decisions-whether those wishes suggest that care should be
discontinued or that specific sorts of care should be provided.
Interdisciplinary efforts to review, improve, and develop advancecare-planning tools will encourage improvements in existing laws, support clinicians who are ready to engage in advance-care-planning conversations with their patients, and encourage everyone to "CHAT" with
his or her clinicians and with potential surrogate decision makers. These
developments are extraordinarily important in and of themselves. They
also provide models of good health care.
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Some patients need to engage in repeated conversations with clinicians about advance
care planning before they understand the issues and can knowledgably offer personal responses. See 10 FAQs, supra note 367.
371
These conversations should be covered for older, sick children as well. The complexities of pediatric decision making, even for older adolescents, however, are beyond the scope
of this Article.
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See supra Part VI.

